


GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY AGAINST
THE MAOIST INSURGENCY
IN NEPAL



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

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M.A., Tribhuwan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, 2008

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY AGAINST THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL,
by Major Dil Bikram Subba, Nepal Army, 133 pages.

The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal broke out when the international situation was unfavorable for the Communists, and it grew faster than anticipated. The Government of Nepal's (GoN's) effort was not well planned; however, many of the counterinsurgency (COIN) principles established by Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, were employed. Some of the principles were partially effective in the initial stage, but most of the principles were not. The main reasons behind the GoN's ineffectiveness in the COIN campaign are as follows: the GoN demonstrated a lack of commitment to defeat the insurgency, there was a lack of resources, and a lack of adequate international support. The lack of commitment by the GoN led to its failure to formulate a well defined COIN strategy. The GoN received support from various countries, but the resources available were inadequate. Hence, the overall COIN effort of GoN was less effective until 2001. The unstable political situation leading to lack of strong commitment of the state, and unreliable support of international community in terms resources impacted the overall COIN effort. In overall, the political factors, lack of resources and international support were the key COIN principles which resulted in the failure of the COIN effort.

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ACRONYMS

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN-UML	Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist
CPN-M	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
COIN	Counterinsurgency
GoN	Government of Nepal
HN	Host Nation
IO	Information Operations
ISDP	Integrated Security and Development Program
JP	Joint Publication
NA	Nepalese Army
NC	Nepali Congress
RNA	Royal Nepalese Army
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ULF	United Left Front
UPF	United People's Front
US	United States
VDC	Village Development Committee

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

General

Nepal emerged as a state almost 2000 years ago; however, it slowly disintegrated into a number of small states in the course of history. It again became a unified state over 200 years ago, centered on Kathmandu with its 2000 years of urban civilization.¹ It is a small Himalayan country in South Asia sandwiched between two giant nuclear and economic power states, China and India. Although never colonized by any colonial or foreign power, Nepal is influenced by the major power states and its big neighbors. Due to its geographical and social proximity, there has been a huge amount of influence from India from very beginning. It shares a common culture and tradition with India along with a long, open and porous border.

Nepal is a multicultural and multiethnic country inhabited by 102 ethnic communities which speak almost 92 different languages. Most of the population is concentrated in the rural areas and more than 60 percent of them live below the poverty line. Most of the villages in the mountains and Himalayas are very remote with no modern development or infrastructure. Due to this diversity, there has always existed a number of issues among the different communities. The Maoist insurgency is one of the significant issues among them in the history of Nepal.

Nepal is among some of the few rare countries where the influence of Communism is increasing despite its recent downfall in rest of the world. The rise and

¹John Whelpton, *A History of Nepal* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), i.

spread of Communist theories and principles around the world were significant political phenomena after the end of World War II. It emerged as the tough competitor of western capitalism, which led to the approximately four and half decade long Cold War. Despite the fact that most of the Communist regimes had collapsed by late 1990s, the Communist theories and beliefs remained a significant political theory and belief among the people, especially in the third world. The Communists exploited the existing economic disparity, poverty, ethnic and regional issues and weaknesses of the existing governments in the poor and developing countries of Asia, Africa and other parts of the world. In most of the cases, they remained as legitimate political parties, but in some cases they used violence to capture political power. The case of Nepal is no different than others.

The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts of the Government of Nepal (GoN) in the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency i.e. before the ‘assassination of King Birendra by his son² on 1 June 2001. The research and analysis in this thesis endeavors to evaluate the government effort against the Maoist insurgency and COIN principles used with respect to the COIN principles established by the United States (US) joint Counterinsurgency doctrine Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. The analysis will focus on the government's response. The COIN principles established by the JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, will be the principal framework for analysis.

²Birendra was 10th king of the Shah Dynasty and one of the most popular kings in the history in Nepal. He was assassinated by his own oldest son Crown Prince Deependra along with almost a dozen other family members and relatives. The main reason is said to be due to the King's disapproval of the Crown Prince's' girlfriend for marriage.

Fighting an insurgency is one of the most complex jobs for a state. This is mainly due to the complexity involving the socio-political, economic and psychological aspects of the population. Such complexity occurs when the government becomes weak and lacks adequate resources. Hence, the government's ability to address the problem of the population will be limited. The rebellion's political groups aim to exploit the volatile situation in order to make the situation more difficult. Under such conditions, governments are forced to use military power as the last resort. This normally fails to produce positive results due to a lack of suitable environment, support and resources.

Military forces are only one tool of the state in its broader approach to combating insurgency. The final solution in any insurgency is normally settled by a political process. The orientation of the militaries to conventional war fighting extremely limits their ability to effectively transition to unconventional warfare. Communist insurgency and Islamic extremism are the two dominant forms of insurgencies in the world. They differ in a few aspects, but the fundamental nature and principles in all types of insurgencies remain the same.

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal started in the 1990s, a unique timeframe when most of the Communist regimes in East Europe were disappearing one by one. In such circumstances, it was hard to imagine the emergence and development of a Communist insurgency in any part of the world. Never the less, the Maoist insurgency emerged in 1996 and developed swiftly in Nepal. It soon started to challenge the state authorities.

There are a number of conspiracy theories behind the development of the Maoist insurgency. In the initial phase of the Maoist insurgency, some believed that the king was sponsoring or supporting the Maoists with a goal of weakening the multi-party

democratic system. “. . . The Nepali Congress (NC) has long been suspicious of the Palace’s intention behind the Maoist’s ever-increasing threat to parliamentary democracy. Its senior most leaders have publicly hinted that they suspect that the palace may have played some role in sabotaging anti-Maoist operation.”³ The Maoist’s friendly attitude towards the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA)⁴ before 2001 as well as toward the Royal Palace combined with the Army’s reluctance to deploy against the Maoists somehow seem to be supporting this conspiracy theory.

Immediately after the Royal Massacre, an article (letter) from Maoist Leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai was published in a leading Nepali language journal, the *Kantipur Daily*, on 6 June 2001. It should be noted that the article appears after the death of King Birendra and his family and was published after it could not be challenged by him. The intent or the theme of that article also somehow supports the conspiracy theory of a Palace–Maoist alliance. “Some Marxist ‘pundits’ called us a pro-monarchy party, and we can now say that we--Nepal Communist Party -Maoist (CPN-M) and King Birendra--had similar views on many national issues and this had created in fact an informal alliance between us.”⁵ Dr. Bhattarai had accepted the contribution of the Shah Kings in the

³Deepak Thapa, “Radicalism and the Emergence of Maoism,” in *Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion*, ed. Michael Hutt (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), 21-37.

⁴As the political parties wanted to break the influence of the King in Army, the Royal Nepalese Army was renamed as Nepalese Army after the political change in Nepal in 2006.

⁵Dr Baburam Bhattarai in his article “Let’s Give No Legitimacy to the Beneficiaries of the New Kot Massacre.” Immediately after the Royal Massacre, this article (letter) from Maoist Leader Dr Bhattarai was published in a leading Nepali language journal, the *Kantipur Daily* on 6 June 2001. Within hours of the letter’s appearance the publisher and editors of the paper were in jail under arrest, where they

history of Nepal in the same article. “Despite the differences on many issues, an important contribution of the Shah Kings has been to preserve Nepali independence and sovereign status from the hands of British imperialism and later from Indian expansionism.”⁶ S. D. Muni, in his book *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Challenges and Responses*, has also argued that the Maoist leaders have admitted to having a “working unity” and understanding with King Birendra.⁷

Soon after the start of the insurgency in Nepal, the government started various steps to crush the insurgency. The mobilization of the Nepal police to crush the Maoist activities in the mid-western part in the early stage and the implementation of ISDP are some of the significant steps taken by the state. The police operation was mainly focused on the physical elimination of the Maoist activists rather than being focused on supporting the political process. The government had no political and economic plan to counter the Maoist agendas and activities. Thus, the two phases of police operations failed to yield positive results. They instead escalated the expansion of the insurgency into wider areas.

However, the government did try to address the issues and grievances of the people in the later phase by employing the Internal Security and Development Program

remain. The scandal of this assault on the press has received global attention that is only somewhat less intense than the reporting on the palace massacre itself.

⁶Bhattarai, “Let’s Give No Legitimacy to the Beneficiaries of the New Kot Massacre.”

⁷S. D. Muni is an Indian Professor who is said to be an influential Nepal policymaker in India. He was also a teacher of Maoist Leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. For his analysis of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, Also see S. D. Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Challenges and Responses* (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2003), 29-30.

(ISDP)⁸ in the Maoist affected areas. It was showing some positive indications in the initial phases, but before it could have a result, the situation worsened.

After the assassination of King Birendra, the situation deteriorated greatly. As the new King took over, the democratic institutions did not work properly. Most of the time, the political parties and the King were busy fighting each other rather than fighting the insurgency. The Maoists exploited the rift between the political parties and the King. As a result, the government failed to formulate any concrete strategy to fight against the insurgency. The security forces had to fight on their own without specific political directions, specific objectives or the unified support of the political parties.

The US Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The US military had extensive experience with fighting against different types of unconventional wars and insurgencies in Mexico in 1840s, in the South in the 1860s, and in the Philippines, as well as the Indian wars but any Army interest in COIN style doctrine was episodic and brief.⁹ The first US Army COIN manual was written in late 1940s but soon the focus of the military changed to nuclear warfare and COIN became a neglected subject. Hence, no serious attempt was given to develop and update a workable COIN doctrine before Vietnam War. The Vietnam War in the 1960s produced a flurry of

⁸ISDP was a modified version of the US concept of internal defense and development (IDAD) which is defined as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society (DOD).

⁹Conrad Crane, “The Evolution of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/events/06-11/slides/Crane_AUSA06.pdf (accessed 28 December 2009).

publications surrounding the Vietnam COIN experience.¹⁰ Yet the US military neglected any attempt to develop a COIN doctrine after the end of Vietnam War. During the cold war, the focus quickly turned to defeating the Soviets in Europe. In the 1980s, however, the interest in counterinsurgency returned, but this interest centered on an El Salvador model with minimal direct US involvement. The capstone operations manuals cited Vietnam as an example of over-involvement in COIN, did not foresee a major role for conventional forces, and paid little attention to the subject.¹¹

After the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001; the US military became extensively involved in COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With this, a new and updated COIN doctrine was necessary. The Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, responded by producing an interim Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) on 1 October 2004, designated Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22.¹² Work on a replacement manual began immediately but did not gain momentum until October 2005, when Lieutenant General David Petraeus returned from his second tour in Iraq to assume command of the Combined Arms Center and took responsibility for all the doctrinal development in the US Army.¹³ A more comprehensive COIN doctrine was published in the form of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* in 2006.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,” <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519foreword.html> (accessed 28 December 2009).

¹³Ibid.

The US military Joint Staff produced the new joint doctrine JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, in 2009, which is said to be based on the most recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. It has again affirmed the complexity of a COIN environment and emphasized the importance of popular support.

The nature of insurgency and the condition under which the counterinsurgents operate may be different in each case. Conversely, COIN, to be successful, should be based on certain principles. “While every insurgency is different because of distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all successful COIN campaigns are based on common principles. All insurgencies use variations of standard frameworks, doctrine and generally adhere to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign plan.”¹⁴ The US Joint COIN doctrine has also established some specific principles¹⁵ which are said to be derived from the historical record and recent experience. “These principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on how to successfully conduct COIN.”¹⁶

¹⁴Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” <http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=709> (accessed 28 December 2009).

¹⁵There are 13 specific Principles of COIN established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. Chapter 2 of this thesis will include more details on the principles and its analysis.

¹⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), III-10.

Research Question

Primary Research Question

Based on the principles of the Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was the Government of Nepal's (GoN's) COIN effort effective during the period 1996 to 2001 (up to the Royal Massacre)?

Secondary Questions

1. Did the GoN follow the COIN principles established by the US Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, to fight against the Maoist insurgency?
2. How were those principles implemented?
3. Which of them were sufficiently resourced?

Significance

Insurgency and irregular warfare have become dominant forms of conflict in recent time. With the development of technology, insurgency has become more popular as it can be waged at a low cost and by a weaker group against a more powerful opponent. The current trend of increases in irregular warfare is likely to remain in coming years. Consequently, governments and military forces need to be prepared to counter irregular warfare. Thus, the research and study of the past irregular warfare is going to be significant well into the future.

Communist insurgency is one of the most common forms of conflict. The ideas authored by Mao Tse-tung on violent revolution and guerilla warfare have been influencing Communist activists and others throughout the world. Many Communist political parties and activists dream of launching a Mao-style Communist revolution.

Most of the Communist insurgencies and uprisings are based on socio-political and economic agendas. Hence, Communist insurgencies around the world, mainly in Asia and Africa, are likely to continue in the future which will be one of the challenges to democratic states.

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal grew up in a unique and unfavorable national and international environment when Communist regimes around the world were falling one after another. Despite this situation, the insurgency grew faster than anticipated and developed into a significant force. The Maoists not only applied the ideas of Mao, but they applied their own innovations in the political, military and diplomatic sectors which proved to be effective and enhanced their activities. In a short period of time, they become a role model for other Maoist Communists in the world. Therefore, it is important to analyze the rise of the Maoist insurgency despite the unfavorable global situation.

Nepal, due to its geo-political situation and socio-economic composition, was always vulnerable to Communism. Additionally, the state always lacked the capability and unity to prevent it. During the insurgency, the GoN received enough international support against the insurgency, but failed to garner support from its own people. In this respect, the development of Maoist insurgency, the strategy applied by the insurgents, the government's approach to deal with the insurgency and the lessons learned may be of great importance for governments and militaries that need to fight or prevent any such insurgency.

The Maoists carefully studied and exploited the geopolitical and socio-economic factors which could be exploited against the existing government and the political

system. Due to the indifference of the state and complex geography, most of the regions of Nepal are not developed and most of the people live in poverty. Discrimination exists on the basis of caste, creed and social status. Although the law prevents such discrimination, the state had done little to eliminate its practice in the society. Maoists exploited all of these factors as weaknesses of the state. They attracted the people of the rural areas to their cause since this is where the reach of the state was already weak. As the insurgency progressed, the Maoists got stronger. The state authority became ineffective and the corresponding control of the state in rural areas became weaker.

The origin of the Maoist insurgency and its development is among its unique qualities. The development of the insurgency and its approach to the state and other political parties was cleverly orchestrated and executed. Its political maneuvering was more decisive than its military operations. The overall result was that the state failed to counter politically and stumbled to its knees. Hence, an intensive research effort to bring out the lessons of the COIN in Nepal is absolutely essential; not only for the Nepalese, but also for others to prevent and fight against similar insurgencies in the future.

The US military is one of the few in the world with extensive COIN experience. Apart from its first-hand experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has also been conducting extensive research. Based on both its experience and research, the US military recently published JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. This research paper aims to use the principles of JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, to analyze the COIN operation in Nepal. The experiences and conclusions drawn from the experiences in Nepal may be valuable in future.

Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made to conduct this study:

It is assumed that the Maoists' activity was an insurgency from the very beginning. The Maoists declared their activities from the very beginning as part of an insurgency. In contrast, the state initially characterized those activities in the period covered in this research paper as criminal activities and applied a criminal justice approach. However, it was claimed to have all the characteristics of a Communist insurgency.

The second assumption is that the views expressed by the individuals will be correct and not influenced by the changed political and security situation. The political situation of Nepal has changed a lot after the assassination of the Royal Family. A few months after the assassination, there was a cease fire but it failed to lead to any permanent solution. After that, the fight intensified. Following a bloody fight with all the security forces including the Nepalese Army, the Maoists were able to maintain a stalemate. However, the Maoists joined the political process which suspended active insurgent violence. Communist insurgents of that time have now become a legitimate political party which is the biggest party in Nepal.

Definitions of Key Terms

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA): It is the peace agreement signed between the GoN and the Maoist insurgents in 2006. It formally ended the active (violent) part of the Maoist insurgency.

Effectiveness: Effectiveness is defined as “producing or capable of producing an intended result or having a striking effect.” Effectiveness of COIN principles will be

judged on the basis of the number of intended outcomes or positive impacts demonstrated by it after its implementation.

Maoist: Members of the Communists group who believe in the Maoist theory of violent revolution.

People's Government: It is a parallel government established by the Maoist insurgents to conduct the daily administration in the area under their influence.

Political Parties: All the political groups legitimately operating in Nepal. These included the NC, CPN-UML and a number of small political groups. CPN-M became a legitimate political party in Nepal only after the peace agreement in 2006.

RNA/NA: The army of Nepal was traditionally called the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) before the peace agreement with the Maoists. Later, it was changed to the Nepalese Army (NA). Both terms in this research paper are used interchangeably.

Security Forces: All the government forces engaged in putting down the Maoist insurgency. These include the Army, Para-military forces and civil police.

Limitations and Delimitations

More than thirteen years have passed since the Maoist Communist insurgency first surfaced. Additionally, the active insurgent violence officially terminated in 2006 with the signing of CPA. However, the extraordinary course of action adopted by the insurgents has not been extensively studied outside of Nepal. This limits the amount of primary source material available in English.

Even in Nepal, the Maoists have published few documents on their strategy during the insurgency. The GoN has not published any documents on its strategy for fighting the Maoist insurgency. Travel to Nepal was not possible during this study.

Though the active insurgent violence lasted until 2006, this research will limit itself to a brief analysis of the then prevailing political situation of the time period 1996-2001, terminating with the assassination of the Royal Family. The main focus of the research will be concentrated towards the GoN's effort in COIN operations. It may not cover the historical context of the socio-ethnic structure and development of Nepal or the broad interests of the international players.

The socio-political system, demographic issues, ethnic, religious and language issues among various communities of Nepal formed a complex historic dynamic which was not considered by the state. This phenomenon played an important role in the origin of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Similarly, the end of active insurgency of the Maoist in Nepal and its transformation into a legitimate political party is somewhat unique in global political history. Both, issues, however, are beyond the scope of this research.

There are thirteen COIN principles established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. However, the researcher rearranged and regrouped those principles as per their priority and significance in the special context of COIN of Nepal. The researcher also modified the 10th COIN principle i.e. “Use Appropriate Level of Force” to “Use Appropriate and Adequate Level of Force.” The researcher did not discuss the 13th COIN principle i.e. Support the Host Nation (HN),¹⁷ as the thesis itself is on behalf of the HN. The researcher did, however, discuss the importance and significance of “International Support” both for the insurgents and counterinsurgents.

¹⁷The US doctrine focused on conducting COIN operation in some other countries where the US interests are compromised. Such a country is called as Host Nation (HN).

Conclusion

The socio-economic condition of Nepal always remained favorable for the Communist ideology, but the Communists in Nepal were late to exploit it. Although, the Communist party in Nepal was established in the late 1940s, it became significant only in 1990. Despite the unfavorable international situation, the Communists in Nepal became more and more popular in the early 1990s.

A democratic political system was established in 1990, but it could not address the grievances and rising aspirations of the masses which prepared the stage for the break out of the insurgency. The political parties could not take suitable steps to prevent the anticipated threat of insurgency. The Maoist insurgency broke out in a unique national and international political situation. The international political situation seemed especially unfavorable for the Communists. However, it quickly grew to significant size.

The socio-political and economic conditions also favored the Maoist agenda. Most parts of the country were very under-developed and most of the people lived well below the line of poverty. The legitimate political parties were not concerned with addressing the grievances of the general population. They were focused on their own interests and agendas. The Maoists exploited all of these factors to forward their cause.

The first section of the following chapter will review the relevant literature on Communist insurgency in general, Nepalese Maoist insurgency specifically and counterinsurgency literatures. The chapter will also review the counterinsurgency theories and principles established by the US counterinsurgency doctrine. The second section will establish the research methodology that will be applied for the research and analysis for the preparation of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter has two parts. Part one includes a review of relevant literature. There is a huge stockpile of literature on Communist ideas, the Maoist insurgency and COIN; but only relevant books and papers were reviewed in preparing this thesis which attempts to answer the following primary research question: “Based on the principles of Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was the Government of Nepal’s COIN effort effective during the period 1996 to 2001 (up to the Royal Massacre)?”

The second part includes the research methodology applied in answering the primary and secondary research question. The research methodology was mainly based on library and online research, interviews and authors own experience and analysis.

Part 1-Literature Review

The Literature Review chapter has four sections. The first section discusses the basic literature on Communist ideas, principles and insurgency experiences of Communist insurgencies in other countries. The second section concentrates on the literature related to COIN principles, theories and experiences in general. The third part includes the Maoist Communist insurgency and COIN efforts of the GoN. The fourth section deals with the joint US military doctrinal approach in COIN with special reference to JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, whereas the final section concludes the literature review.

Section 1: Communist Insurgency in General

The concept of Communism was developed by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in February 1848.¹⁸ The concept was mainly based on economic disparity existing in the society and predicted that the Communist revolution would start from the industrialized countries of Western Europe. However, the first successful Communist revolution happened in 1917 in Russia, which was neither West European nor industrialized at that point of time.

Communist ideas and principles are among some of the most studied and debated subjects in the modern world. It became more significant after the success of the Russian revolution in 1917. After this success, Lenin became a worldwide Communist ideologue and his ideas were copied by Communist parties and leaders in other parts of the world. Lenin was immediately followed by another of the most influential Communist leaders, Mao Tse-tung, who successfully led a violent Communist revolution in China in 1949 and also demonstrated the effectiveness of guerilla warfare.

Mao was one of the most significant and influential leaders in Communist history to follow the ideas of Marx and Lenin and to add his own flavor in it. He generated the idea of “Agrarian Revolution” in the place of the “Industrial Revolution.” He also generated idea of “Violent Revolution” and emphasized the idea that “Political power comes out of the barrel of gun.” Mao successfully implemented his ideas in China and became a proponent of modern guerilla warfare which was successfully implemented in China to overthrow the existing government.

¹⁸The famous book “*Manifesto of Communist Party*” by Karl Marx and Frederic Engels was published in 1848 which marks the beginning of Communist ideas, values and principles in the world.

Mao's idea was of much significance for the rest of the world also. "Mao's revolutionary movement was far more than a simple theory of guerrilla warfare. His theory of revolutionary warfare ultimately led to his final victory and control over the People's Republic of China."¹⁹ The Communist victory in China is an excellent example of a three-phase campaign plan firmly rooted in theoretical and historical military constructs. The theoretical constructs were drawn from Mao's study of Chinese history and culture. Mao's understanding of the nature of the Chinese people and the nature of the civil war were key elements in his strategy.²⁰

The Communists always emphasized the fight against the established government. Various Communist leaders have purposed their ideas on conducting successful revolutionary war. Mao wrote "War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions. Unless you understand the actual circumstances of war, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of war, or know how to direct war, or be able to win victory."²¹ On revolutionary war, Mao wrote "whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its own specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general."²²

¹⁹Thomas P Reilly, "Mao-Tse Tung and Operational Art during the Chinese Civil War" (Monograph, School of Advance Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997-98).

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Mao, Tse-Tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War December 1936," http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm (accessed 1 January 2010).

²²Ibid.

Mao's contribution in guerilla warfare is equally significant. On the importance of guerilla warfare, Mao said "This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy."²³ Mao, in addition, emphasized maintaining a good relationship with the population.

After the success of Mao, many Communist parties all around the world started to copy his ideas; however, it especially succeeded in the third world. Mao's idea of violent revolution and guerilla warfare added a new dimension in the Communist movement. Most of the Communists copied and tried to implement it as it was in China. However, some of Communist parties tried to modify it as per their geo-political situation.

Some significant Communist insurgencies emerged in various parts of the world in similar ways. Most of these followed Mao's style; however a few tried it in slightly different ways. The Communist insurgency of Peru by the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) is among the most significant examples of a group which tried to launch a Mao style Communist insurgency. Though it failed to achieve its aim of overthrowing the government of Peru, it grew to an impressive level. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) is one of the Communist parties following the ideas of Mao.

Section 2-Counterinsurgency Principles and Efforts

There are a number of ideas developed on how to win counter revolutionary wars against the Communist revolutionaries. Among them, David Galula's *Counterinsurgency*

²³Mao Tse-tung, "What Is Guerrilla Warfare?", <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch01.htm> (accessed 1 December 2009).

Warfare: Theory and Practices is one of the most influential and widely accepted, and probably offers one of the most comprehensive theories on fighting an insurgency. In his book, Galula has emphasized the importance of popular support for success of revolutionary warfare and says that “the battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.”²⁴ He identifies the population as the insurgent objective and that dissociating the population from the government, controlling it physically, and gaining its active support wins the war.²⁵ So far this view seems to be a very valid argument. Hence, the main objective of the counterinsurgent must be to win the popular support.

Galula's basic insight into insurgency (which he terms “revolutionary war”) is that “Revolutionary war is political war.” He argues that a revolutionary war is 20 percent military and 80 percent political.²⁶ “Every military action,” he asserts, “has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa.” This means that every sweep, every search-and-destroy mission, every convoy operation has to be planned with uppermost consideration for the effects it will have on the population's support. Conversely, every new sewage system or classroom has to be examined for its military impact.²⁷ “Politics becomes an active instrument of operation.”²⁸ More specifically a strong political will is

²⁴Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 8.

²⁵Ibid., 7.

²⁶Ibid., 89.

²⁷Ibid., 87-90.

²⁸Ibid., 5.

necessary for every COIN action, whether it is to provide social and economic benefits to the people or the use of security forces to physically destroy the insurgents.

The counterinsurgent must use all his assets: “His administrative capabilities, his economic resources, his information and propaganda media, his military superiority due to heavy weapons and large units.” Military, police, and judicial and political operations blend together: “The expected result--final defeat of the insurgents--is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they all are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero.”²⁹

Galula is adamant about the necessity of heeding the military principle of unity of command: “A single boss must direct the operations from beginning to end.” Further, the “boss” must be a representative of the political side: “That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country's political regime and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action is directed toward a political goal.”³⁰ Galula identified the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. These are: a cause, counterinsurgent weakness, geographic conditions, and outside support.³¹

Sir Robert Thompson is another influential theorist in COIN. Thompson, one of the primary architects of British counterinsurgency success in Malaya and the head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam in the early years of the Vietnam War, published one of the most celebrated pieces of COIN literature in 1966, *Defeating*

²⁹Ibid., 87.

³⁰Ibid., 87-89.

³¹Ibid., 17-43.

Communist Insurgency. In his book, Thompson stressed that victory over guerrilla groups requires more than just numerical military superiority and timely response by the state, “. . . any sensible government should attempt to defeat an insurgent movement during the subversive build-up phase before it enters the guerilla phase, and if that is not possible owing to circumstances perhaps outside the government’s control, then the movement must be defeated as early as possible during the guerilla phase.”³² He puts emphasis on knowing and understanding the insurgents. “. . . Anyone having any responsibility for dealing with an insurgent must know his enemy and what the enemy is attempting to do at all the stages.”³³

Thompson's extensive experience, albeit in countering a particular type of rural Maoist guerrillas, led him to establish these principles as the cornerstone of any successful COIN conflict. In the chapter four of the book, Thompson outlines his five “Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency”: the government must have a clear political aim; the government must function in accordance with law; the government must have an overall plan; the government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerillas; and in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.

Both Galula and Thompson's approach to COIN somewhat support the “Hearts and Minds” approach of COIN. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer associated the phrase “Hearts and Minds” with Britain's apparently successful counter-

³²Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 50.

³³Ibid.

insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948–60).³⁴ The phrase “Hearts and Minds” is generally linked to a less coercive, people-centric approach to COIN which emphasizes the importance of using minimum force in order to win the “Hearts and Minds” of the people.³⁵ However, Paul Dixon argues that the phrase “Hearts and Minds” does not accurately describe Britain’s highly coercive campaign in Malaya.³⁶ The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force; it was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights. Britain’s counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland did not deploy the same levels of coercion that were used in Malaya but, nevertheless, considerable levels of coercion were used which did not succeed in winning the “Hearts and Minds” of the people.

W. Patrick Lang, a retired US Army Colonel, in his blog “Sic Semper Tyrannis” argued that that the theory of COIN warfare was developed by the colonial powers as a “cure” for the wave of “wars of national liberation” that swept through their overseas possessions after World War II.³⁷ The central idea was to form a competitive and

³⁴Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a912750182and fulltext=713240928> (accessed 6 February 2010).

³⁵Dr. Paul Dixon is a Reader in Politics and International Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston University, London. He has just published the second edition of Northern Ireland: Dr Dixon has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on 'Hearts and Minds: British Counterinsurgency from Malaya to Iraq' based on a conference co-convened with the Royal United Services Institute.

³⁶Dixon.

³⁷W. Patrick Lang, “Counterinsurgency—a much failed strategy,” Sic Semper Tyrannis blog, entry posted 14 December 2009, http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/12/counterinsurgency-a-much-failed-strategy.html (accessed 7 February 2010).

reformed government, and economic development for the population. It was believed that if this population was “protected” from the Revolutionary Warfare efforts of the insurgents, then the population would choose to side with the counterinsurgents whether the counterinsurgents were the local post-colonial government or an occupying power.³⁸

Colonel Lang argues that the “hearts and minds” approach of COIN is a failed strategy. He says, “COIN theory is predicated on the ability of the counterinsurgents to change the mentality of the “protected” population. The sad truth is that most people do not want to be deprived of their ancestral ways and will fight to protect them. “Hearts and minds” is an empty propagandist’s phrase.”³⁹

Colonel Roger Trinquier presented a similar to “Heart and Mind” approach in COIN. Trinquier was a French military officer who served in numerous conflicts, notably Indochina and Algeria. He wrote several other books on war but they are only available in French. His book *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* became one of the best sellers in France and was translated into English in 1964. In the book, Trinquier writes a discourse describing a new, modern way of warfare using terrorism which aims at overthrowing an existing government and replacing it. Trinquier defined modern war as “an interlocking system of actions--political, economic, psychological, and military--that aims at the overthrow of the established authority and a replacement by another regime.”⁴⁰ Trinquier explains in great detail how terrorists achieve their aim

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (London: The Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964), 6.

avoiding open conflict, terrorizing the local population, integrating within them, forging secret alliances with neighboring countries, claiming innocence and victimization when caught or using the media and international politics to their benefit.

The important COIN topics addressed in Trinquier's book are control of the population, destruction of the guerrilla forces, and abolition of the guerrilla influence on the population. He emphasized the role of the population as most significant in modern warfare. Trinquier argues, "Control of the masses through a tight organization, often through several parallel organizations, is the master weapon of *modern warfare*."⁴¹ Just as the government is greatly dependent on the population so are the guerillas. He noted that the "total dependence on terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point."⁴²

Colonel Trinquier states that the goal of modern warfare for the counterinsurgent is to "eliminate from the midst of the population the entire enemy organization."⁴³ He places particular emphasis on the importance of winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population. However, he emphasizes control while employing the means of winning hearts and minds. "But we must not lose sight of the fact that any material aid we give will only profit the enemy if the organization that permits his control and manipulation of the people has not first been destroyed."⁴⁴

On the strategy of "Modern Warfare," Trinquier supports the ideas of Mao. "The guerilla and terrorism are only one stage of *modern warfare*, designed to create a

⁴¹Ibid., 30.

⁴²Ibid., 64.

⁴³Ibid., 43.

⁴⁴Ibid., 50.

situation favorable to the build-up of a regular army for the purpose of eventually confronting an enemy army on the battlefield and defeating him.”⁴⁵

Colonel Trinquier is against the idea of employing police in this modern warfare. He argued that the police do not have the means of conducting combat operations against a powerful enemy organization whose aim is not to attack individuals protected by the police, but rather to conquer the nation and to overthrow its regime.⁴⁶ He also argued that the army should be used from the very beginning to crush the guerillas before they grow into a significant force. On the necessity of employment of the army in irregular warfare in the early stage, Trinquier says, “The protection of national territory and regime is quite clearly the essential role of the army. By and large, it has the means for victory; there is only the question of will and method.”⁴⁷

Section 3: Maoist Insurgency and COIN in Nepal

The root of the Communist movement in Nepal goes back to the birth of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949.⁴⁸ Like other Communist parties of the world, the ideological differences and continued disintegration became a culture of CPN. However, the development of the Communist movement in Nepal gradually grew in a

⁴⁵Ibid., 52.

⁴⁶Ibid., 51.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Purna B. Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations” (Master’s Thesis, Student Reference Section, Gray Research Center and Library, Quantico, Virginia, 2008).

positive direction. In the “people’s movement of 1990,”⁴⁹ the United Left Front (ULF)⁵⁰ played a decisive role in overthrowing the “Panchayat System”⁵¹ and establishing the democratic system.

Nepalese Communists were always influenced by major Communist countries in the world and Communist parties. In the beginning, Nepalese Communists were highly influenced by the Communist parties of India. Later, the principles and ideas of Chinese and Russian Communist parties exerted their influence. The series of splintering among the Communists in Nepal was due to the influence of those various Communist groups. In a similar pattern, Nepal’s Maoist movement was highly influenced by the Indian Naxalites⁵² and the Peruvian Shining Path. “The two insurgencies that exercised the most influence early on were Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), and the so called ‘Naxalite’ or Indian Maoists.”⁵³ The rise of Shining Path in Peru in early 1980s slowly started to influence Nepalese Communist movement.

⁴⁹King Mahendra imposed ban on all political parties and established ‘Party less Panchayat System’ in 1960. This political system ended in 1990 after a massive joint political campaign by political parties and reestablished multi party democratic system.

⁵⁰A front formed by Alliance of Seven different Communist Parties against the Panchayat System.

⁵¹Panchayat System was a Party less Political system which lasted until 1990. During this period, all other political parties were banned and king had an absolute political and constitutional powers.

⁵²“Naxalite” was a Communist movement in India inspired by the success of the Mao in China. This movement was started in 1967 in a place called Naxalbari, about 15 KM east from the eastern boarder of Nepal. The movement was soon suppressed by Indian Government but its residue still exists in various parts of India. Some young Communists of Nepal copied the same action in Jhapa district of Nepal in early 1970s.

⁵³Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2007), 305.

The first visible influence of the Shining Path in Nepal was seen in early 1990s. “In October 1990, a 50 meter long political slogan appeared on the wall outside luxury Himalaya Hotel in Patan. The text, which bore many similarities with the Peruvian one of 1978, read ‘Down with local feudalism.’”⁵⁴ As the activities of Shining Path increased in Peru, it started to have a significant impact on Communist parties of Nepal. R. Andrew Nickson claimed that Nepal’s socio-economic, political and demographic conditions were similar with that of Peru.⁵⁵ The Maoist movement also started to develop in similar ways as the Shining Path. “In the early 1990s, was the CPN-M, a body that in its formative stages consciously modeled itself on *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path).”⁵⁶ Nepal, in fact, was very vulnerable to any sort of conflict because of its internal dynamics.

Many scholars agree that the socio-political and ethnic issues in Nepal were the main problem which made Nepal very vulnerable to Communist insurgency. They argue that the policy of state to exclude various minorities, castes and communities including the Maoists in the nation-building process, especially in the constitution making process after 1990, led to the origin of Maoist insurgency.⁵⁷

⁵⁴R. Andrew Nickson in 1992 published an article “Democratization and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?” in *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative politics* and the same article was later published in the book *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal*, edited by Deepak Thapa.

⁵⁵Nickson, “Democratization and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?”, 21.

⁵⁶Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia*, 303.

⁵⁷Mahendra Lawoti, “*Towards Democratic Nepal*” (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2005), 1-15.

The Maoists gradually increased their organization and activities from the mid-western part of Nepal. The techniques and methodology adopted by the Maoists in Nepal was no different from other Communist insurgencies around the world. “Methodology was predictable and mirrored that of other insurgent movements following people’s war approach. While ‘winning hearts and minds’ was important in the base areas, terror was indispensable for expanding into contested populations.”⁵⁸

The government still failed to take any serious actions at the beginning. Krishna Hachhethu blames the inability of the incumbent Government to assess the gravity of the situation while tackling the Maoist insurgency as the major factor for faster than anticipated growth of the Maoist movement.⁵⁹ As the Maoists started to get stronger, they methodically started to displace state authority by systematic use of terror attacks against selected targets, mainly the police outposts and government supporters. By using such tactics, the Maoists were able to create a “counter-state” in the remote areas of the mid-western part of Nepal.⁶⁰ As the state authorities were evacuated, the Maoists took opportunity to increase their control in those areas.

The open and porous border with India was of great help to Maoists in conducting their activities and take safe shelter across the border. The Maoists were getting help and support from various Communist groups inside India. Apart from that, some scholars and

⁵⁸Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia*, 311.

⁵⁹Krishna Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2001,” in *Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion* ed. Michael Hutt (London: Hurst and Company, 2004), 58-78.

⁶⁰Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia*, 311-317.

politicians often blame Indian authorities for supporting the Maoists and providing safe haven for their leaders to fulfill their hidden interests.⁶¹

Counterinsurgency in Nepal

Interestingly, the GoN or any of its security forces have not yet published a post conflict assessment. However, a large stockpile of the books and documents written and published by various individuals and agencies are available on the COIN efforts of the GoN. Most of the documents have concluded that the government effort was weak and off-track, or heavily criticized the government's efforts.

The GoN had no clear COIN strategy to deal with the insurgency. The Nepalese Army has a COIN school where officers and NCOs are trained in COIN methods but most of the concepts are borrowed from the lessons of Malaya and other COIN experiences. The army's approach in this school was heavily based on "winning the hearts and minds," but there was less clarity as to "how." However, when the Maoist insurgency was eminent in Nepal and police were actually mobilized against the insurgency, the Nepalese Army (NA) started to train police and other security agencies on COIN. This effort was not sufficient.

Most of the writers have criticized the GoN and the security forces in their approach to deal with the insurgency. S. D. Muni has criticized the GoN, military and King and looked more sympathetically on the Maoists. Most of his arguments are based on informal talks with Maoist leaders. In a number of places, the facts are more

⁶¹ Saubhagya Shah, "A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadow of Legacy Raj," in *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*, ed. Michael Hutt (London: Hurst and Company, 2004), 192-224.

exaggerated especially on the Maoist successes.⁶² Muni himself was a teacher and said to be closely linked with top Maoist leader Dr Baburam Bhattarai.⁶³

The GoN never had a serious consideration of the Maoist issue and thus failed to formulate a strategy against the insurgency in time. The main reason for this was the political instability. “Not only the governments changed with startling rapidity, on average one per year, but governance was only possible due to the formation of various intra-and even inter-state coalitions.”⁶⁴

The police operation against the insurgency did not go as expected because of a lack of a suitable strategy and the will power of state. Another significant flaw was that the government agencies lacked intelligence to conduct operations against the Maoist insurgents. “--the police, Armed Police Force, RNA and National Investigation Department--were quite unprepared for the demands of internal war and generally deficient in information gathering and intelligence production and dissemination.”⁶⁵

There were some good steps by the government to win the support of the population and isolate the Maoist insurgents. Among them, the Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP) was one of the most significant and produced successful results in its initial stage. As per the plan, NA would provide a security shield to bring

⁶²S.D. Muni is an Indian professor, self proclaimed expert on Nepal. His book *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenges and Response* gives Indian perspective.

⁶³TelegraphNepal.com, “Self-declared Nepal expert Prof. Muni says he was not a RAW man,” http://www.telephagnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=6666 (accessed 28 December 2009).

⁶⁴Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia*, 318.

⁶⁵Ibid., 319.

government presence to underdeveloped area, and the government agencies would conduct activities to improve the livelihood of the area.⁶⁶ But the program did not go as anticipated. “As things worked out the NA was the only element of the government that actually fulfilled its role.”⁶⁷ Other governmental agencies also failed to fulfill their roles due to a lack of clear guidelines, resources, and coordination from the state.

In overall assessment, the security forces operated under a difficult civil-military institutional framework .Although the meager resources available were able to prevent the rebels from achieving their revolutionary objective , the overall government response was inconsistent and inappropriate throughout the period.⁶⁸

Section 4: The US Doctrine in Counterinsurgency

The US has a long history of involvement in irregular wars. The US Civil War was, perhaps, the first significant war where both regular and irregular forces were used as a strategy.⁶⁹ After that, the US forces took part in various irregular wars; however, a serious attempt to write a COIN doctrine came only after World War II. US Army Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann wrote the first US doctrine on COIN based on

⁶⁶Ibid., 318.

⁶⁷Ibid., 319.

⁶⁸Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

⁶⁹Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operation Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2004), 23.

his experience in waging irregular war against the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II, which became the basis of all counter guerilla doctrine.⁷⁰

Soon the US national military focus shifted to nuclear war. Hence, the COIN doctrine and training received little priority. By 1958-59, COIN became a forgotten phenomenon.⁷¹ After 1960, some literature on COIN started to appear and military schools started to reincorporate COIN in their curriculum.⁷² However, when the US was involved in irregular war in Vietnam, there was little to no doctrinal guidance available to the troops. After the Vietnam War, COIN once again became a forgotten chapter because the military as an institution wanted to avoid conducting irregular warfare again.

However, after the involvement of the US forces Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army realized the necessity of a new COIN doctrine. Hence, the US Army published FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006 for COIN operations in the continuing conflicts. The Army published this FM in the context of the “Global War on Terrorism” with a specific focus on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The writers acknowledged that given the complexity and changing characteristics of COIN operations, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, was incomplete, and hoped that the professional journals such as *Military Review* and discussions on the Battle Command Knowledge System would serve as forums for updating COIN methods.

New COIN doctrine has accepted that insurgency is a complex form of conflict where the political, social, economic and psychological aspects have profound effects.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., 157-171.

⁷²Ibid.

All these factors make COIN an extremely complex form of warfare. In the COIN environment, the support of population is extremely important. At its core, COIN is a struggle for control and support of the population. The protection and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN agencies in a comprehensive approach.⁷³

In continuing the development of COIN doctrine, the US military Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new doctrine, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, in 2009 which is based on the most recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. It has again confirmed the complexity of the COIN environment and emphasized the importance of the popular control and support. Given the complexity and nature of COIN operation, it states that all the COIN operations must be led by civilians to maintain the unity of effort.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of COIN operations across the range of military operations. The preface of the book gives some guidelines for application. Though the doctrine has specific policy guidelines to the commanders, it still gives room for a ground commander's initiative. It says "the guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."⁷⁴ Given the complexity and nature of COIN operation, it states that all the COIN operations must be led by civilians. But it also suggests other ways out in

⁷³Department of Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-28.

⁷⁴Ibid., i.

difficult situation. “When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN.”⁷⁵

This publication provides doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of COIN operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.⁷⁶ It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the US in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for the US involvement in multinational operations.⁷⁷

Principles of COIN (JP 3-24)

New doctrine has established 13 clear sets of COIN principles.⁷⁸ They are:

1. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Operational Environment (OE): JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, describes, “This understanding includes the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other aspects. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention to society, culture, and insurgent advantages within the Operational Environment.”⁷⁹ It gives special emphasis on the cultural knowledge of the area, detailed knowledge about the local and influential leaders and

⁷⁵Ibid., x.

⁷⁶Ibid., i.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸The principles as stated in JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, are in same sequence.

⁷⁹Ibid., III-10.

knowledge and understanding about the possible advantages that the insurgents can take from the local situations.⁸⁰

2. Legitimacy is the Main Objective: The counterinsurgent should establish legitimacy by winning the confidence of the people but not by coercive means. JP 3-24 describes six possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability: “the ability to provide security for the populace, the selection of leaders in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace, a high level of popular participation in or support for political processes; a culturally acceptable level of corruption; a culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; the existence and acceptance of laws; and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.”⁸¹

3. Unity of Effort is Essential: JP 3-24 states, “. . . well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN.”⁸² Hence, it is imperative that all the forces and agencies involved in carrying out COIN activities in a given area operate under a unified decision-making structure to produce a desired result.

4. Political Factors are Primary: JP 3-24; *Counterinsurgency Operation*, puts a great emphasis on the political factors. “The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable. Military actions executed without properly

⁸⁰Ibid., III-11.

⁸¹Ibid., III-12.

⁸²Ibid., III-13.

assessing their diplomatic and political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are counterproductive.”⁸³ On the method of resolving insurgency, joint doctrine emphasizes the importance of a political solution. “Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution. Moreover, most solutions involve some sort of political compromise and are rarely a ‘winner takes all’ situation.”⁸⁴

5. Intelligence Drives Operations: JP 3-24 emphasizes on the importance of intelligence in COIN operations. “In all cases corroboration of the information retains significant importance to prevent acting upon false, misleading, or circular reporting. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable operational tempo, drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level.”⁸⁵

6. Insurgents must be Isolated from their Cause and Support: Isolating the insurgents from their cause and support is perhaps the most important principle for defeating insurgents, but it is also very difficult. On means and methods of isolating the insurgents, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, suggests isolating them by cutting logistics, reducing finances and maintaining momentum of the COIN activities.⁸⁶ It also argues that as the government increases its legitimacy, the populace will assist the counterinsurgents more actively.⁸⁷

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., III-14.

⁸⁶Ibid., III-14,15.

⁸⁷Ibid.

7. Security under the Rule of Law is Essential: Maintaining security and the rule of law are often two contradictory things in counterinsurgency environment. It has direct impact on the government's effort to maintain its legitimacy. The US joint doctrine accepts this fact. "It is a paradox of COIN that the increased use of force required to maintain order decreases the perceived legitimacy of counterinsurgent actions."⁸⁸ However, it still emphasizes avoiding illegitimate actions and evidence gathering for the support of the legitimate actions.

8. Counterinsurgents should prepare for a Long-Term Commitment: War against insurgency is naturally a long war because the insurgents always try to drag the conventional forces into a war of attrition in order to overcome the material superiority of the counterinsurgents. Involvement of other factors, mainly political, economic and socio-ethnic issues prevent the immediate solution. Insurgents put every effort to prevent the counterinsurgents from finding a solution by exploiting all possible issues. Hence, the counterinsurgents must be prepared to fight a long war which includes military, political and other socio-economic issue.

9. Manage Information and Expectations: The government should try to fulfill the expectations of the people or maintain them to a manageable level. To limit discontent and build support, a government must create and maintain realistic expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and even the international community. Information operations (IO) will be a key tool to accomplish this.⁸⁹ Keeping the people informed

⁸⁸Ibid., III-15,16.

⁸⁹Cohen et al., "Principles, Paradoxes, and Imperatives of Counterinsurgency."

about the state of affairs is a key for the government to maintain the expectations, and instill a sense of ownership of the government among the people.

10. Use the Appropriate Level of Force: Counterinsurgent should always employ superior forces in terms of strength and quality in order to retain the initiative at all times. “Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the population’s core grievances through stability operations as well as providing security a trusted presence within the population.”⁹⁰ However, great care should be taken to prevent collateral damage. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.⁹¹

11. Learn and Adapt: Normally COIN and other forms of irregular warfare are the most difficult due to their complexity, changing nature and unpredictability. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. However, skillful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents.⁹² Hence the counterinsurgents must be able to learn from their activities and adapt to changing situations. Commanders must develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command.⁹³

12. Empower the Lowest Levels: The COIN, to be successful, should be able to impact all levels of society. Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules

⁹⁰JP 3-24, III-18.

⁹¹Ibid., III-18.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

for the use of force and ROE.⁹⁴ Successful decentralized execution results from exercise, by subordinate leaders at all echelons, of disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions.⁹⁵ The US joint doctrine emphasizes initiative by commanders at all levels for the success in COIN operation.

13. Support the Host Nation (HN). US Joint COIN doctrine principles are intended to be used in the HN rather than in US territory itself. The basic aim is to support the HN to be strong enough to fight by itself. "The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself."⁹⁶ The US does not intend to win the war for the HN but creates favorable situation for the HN to fight against the insurgents. "Regardless of the starting conditions, the HN ultimately has to win on its own."⁹⁷

Section 5: Summary of Literature Review

The idea of communism was originated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in mid-19th century. The main aims were eliminating the economic disparity and providing power to the poor industrial labors. Though Marx and Engels predicted the first Communist revolution would occur in some West European industrialized country, the first successful revolution occurred in non-industrialized Russia in early 20th century.

The impact of the Communist ideology gradually expanded to other parts of world. After World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic emerged as a world

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid., III-19.

⁹⁷Ibid.

power and led Communist countries against the capitalist western countries. Similarly the Communists gained success in China in 1950 where Mao was instrumental. His ideas influenced Communist parties all around the world. Most of the current Communist insurgents are following Mao's ideas on how to launch insurgency in their respective countries. CPN-M was one of the parties which followed the ideas of Mao.

Although the active form of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is already finished, no significant literature on the in depth analysis of the COIN effort has been published. Most of the literatures on this issue are superficial. There is a gap in the study concerning the means to join the national direction to a specific military plan. There was a huge gap between the political leadership and the military which created differences.

The US joint doctrine JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, is one of the significant steps, but it is yet to be fully tested. Although the socio-economic and political situation may be different and severely impact the COIN effort, the basic principles of the COIN remain same. In this aspect, the COIN principles established by JP 3-24 may be a guideline for other militaries conducting COIN operation in the near future.

Part 2-Research Methodology

It is difficult to determine the actual outcome of a subject such as insurgency and COIN in quantitative terms where political, socio-economic and psychological issues get precedence. It may also be equally difficult to compare the insurgency and COIN experiences of one place to similar experiences of other places as the dominant factors like socio-political situation, economic background, and other various aspects may be quite different. Hence, the outcome or the experiences of insurgency and COIN can be determined and compared only in relative terms after establishing some agreeable

parameters. In this thesis, the researcher intended to analyze the COIN effort of GoN with respect to the COIN principles established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

To answer primary and secondary research questions, my methods of research were two-phased. The first was an intensive library search while the second consisted of the GoN and the Maoist documents, and supporting interviews of the experts who were closely watching and studying the COIN efforts of the GoN.

As a member of the NA, the researcher had a close look on all the events, ups and downs of the Maoist insurgency from the very beginning. The researcher was also actively involved in the COIN operation in the later phase of the insurgency as a platoon and company commander, and also as an instructor in the COIN School. The researcher also read several publications on this topic. Based on the knowledge of the Maoist insurgency, the researcher selected the research topic. The selection criterion for the research question was discussed in committee at an early stage to identify its relevance.

Framework of Analysis

Several models were considered to determine a suitable framework of analysis. Among them is David Galula's framework on COIN in his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practices*. His book is one of the widely accepted and offers one of the most comprehensive theories on fighting an insurgency. Galula identifies the population as the insurgent objective and that dissociating the population from the government, controlling it physically, and gaining its active support wins the war.

Galula has put great importance in the political aspect of every military action. "This means that every sweep, every search-and-destroy mission, every convoy operation has to be planned with uppermost consideration for the effects it will have on the

population's support; conversely, every new sewage system or classroom has to be examined for its military impact.”⁹⁸ More specifically a strong political will is necessary for every COIN action, whether it is to provide social and economic benefits to the people or, the use of the military to physically destroy the insurgent groups.

The counterinsurgent must use all his assets. “His administrative capabilities, his economic resources, his information and propaganda media, his military superiority due to heavy weapons and large units, all of which are cumbersome and relatively useless against the illusive insurgent.”⁹⁹ Military, police, judicial and political operations must be integrated. “The expected result--final defeat of the insurgents--is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they all are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero.”¹⁰⁰ Galula is adamant about the necessity of heeding the military principle of unity of command for the effective implementation of the COIN effort.

In 1966 Sir Robert Thompson in his book *Defeating Communist Insurgency* stressed that victory over guerrilla groups requires more than just numerical military superiority and timely response by the state. He puts a heavy emphasis on knowing and understanding the insurgents from the very beginning. Thompson's extensive experience in countering rural Maoist guerrillas, led him to acclaim these principles as the basis of any successful COIN. In Chapter Four of the book, Thompson outlines his five “Basic Principles of Counterinsurgency”:

⁹⁸Galula, 87-90.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 58.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 87.

The first principle of the COIN effort as outlined by Thompson is that the government must have a clear political aim. He argued, “Unless the long term aim is constantly borne in mind, there will be tendency to adopt short-term *ad hoc* measures merely as reactions to insurgent initiative or with the limited aim of attempting to defeat the insurgents militarily in the guerilla phase.”¹⁰¹

The second principle is that the government must function in accordance with law. He argued that if the government itself breaches the norms of law, it will lose its moral authority to impose law on others. “A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the rights to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for advantage of being the government.”¹⁰²

The third principle is that the government must have an overall plan. Normally the governments intend to crush the armed activities first rather than addressing the core issue which often creates more complex situation. Hence, the government from beginning must have a comprehensive plan. “It (plan) must include all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency.”¹⁰³

The forth principle is that the government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerillas. Insurgency is a political problem and the solution will be political. Only defeating the guerillas or the military wing of the insurgents may not be sufficient. Hence the government plans to defeat the political wing. “Unless Communist

¹⁰¹Ibid., 52.

¹⁰²Ibid., 52-53.

¹⁰³Ibid., 55.

subversive political organization in the towns and villages is broken and eliminated, the insurgent guerilla units will not be defeated.”¹⁰⁴

The fifth principle is that in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first. Only the political initiatives may not guide the process to right track. If the government hesitates to use its military might, the insurgents may consider it as the weakness of the government. Hence, the government must use the army to pressure the insurgents for the political solution. The use of military should be directed towards the core of the insurgency so as to force them hard.

The recently published US joint COIN doctrine JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, is the latest in a series which establishes thirteen specific COIN principles. They are: Counterinsurgents must Understand the Operational Environment (OE), Legitimacy is the Main Objective, Unity of Effort is Essential, Political Factors are Primary, Intelligence Drives Operations, Insurgents Must be Isolated from their Cause and Support, Security under the Rule of Law is Essential, Counterinsurgents should prepare for a Long-Term Commitment, Manage Information and Expectations, Use the Appropriate Level of Force, Learn and Adapt, Empower the Lowest Levels, Support the Host Nation (HN). These principles will be an excellent framework for analyzing a COIN. The researcher intends to use these principles for analyzing the COIN effort of GoN.

After considering all possible frameworks, I decided to use the COIN principles of JP 3-24; *Counterinsurgency Operations*, published in 2009 to analyze the COIN effort of the GoN as it is the most recently published and it is also based on the latest experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the researcher rearranged and

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 56.

regrouped those principles as per the priority and significance in the special context of COIN effort in Nepal. The researcher did not discuss the 13th principle (i.e. Support the HN) as the thesis itself on behalf of HN; instead the researcher analyzed the role of international support for both the state and the insurgents.

The framework of the analysis and rearrangement of the COIN principles is shown in the figure 1.




Figure 1. COIN Principles, Framework of Analysis
Source: Created by Mr Stuart Lyon and adopted by author.

Phase 1: Library Research

The researcher collected enough recorded information, opinions and facts from published books, magazines published from Nepal and other countries. The researcher studied online documents, previous theses and dissertations written by various researchers in the US Army Command and General Staff College and other institutions.

The Combined Arms Research Library and online sources were the main sources of information and data to conduct my research. I also collected more books and documents which were not available in Combined Arms Research Library through inter-library loans, especially to acquire sources published in Nepal. The books and documents I used from the library were as follows:

1. Books and documents related to Communist Insurgency in general.
2. Books and documents related to Communist Insurgency in other countries.
3. Books/Monographs and documents related to the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.
4. Other related and miscellaneous documents.

Phase 2: Conduct of Interview

In the next phase, the researcher also collected more data and information from scholars, experts, retired military and government officials who had actively participated in planning and executing COIN efforts or watched it closely during the various phases of insurgency period. The researcher communicated to those individuals by electronic mail to get their consent for interview. After getting the consent, the researcher prepared and discussed the appropriate research questions with the thesis committee. The interview questions were finalized and approved by the committee, and sent to the selected

individuals by electronic mail by end of November 2009. The researcher received interviews by electronic mail.

The interview questions were mainly focused on the government's COIN efforts during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. From the interview, the researcher established a clear set of principles employed by the GoN to fight against the insurgency. The researcher also analyzed the effectiveness of various COIN principles, cause of effectiveness or failure of those principles from the views of the experts.

Phase 3: Analysis of Information

In phase three, the researcher analyzed the data and information collected from library research and from the interviews. The researcher carried out the analysis in the light of his own experiences in addition to the information received during the research. The analysis mainly focused on answering the primary and secondary research questions.

Sequence and Timeline of research

In late December 2009, the researcher collected all the relevant information and begins detailed analysis. The researcher worked according to the timelines in the MMAS handbook. The steps used follow this pattern:

1. Topic selection and refinement.
2. Gathering of relevant information to answer the question.
3. Recording the information.
4. Evaluating the information.
5. Arranging the data into understandable and meaningful groups.
6. Communicating the findings.

Layout of Thesis

The researcher analyzed the COIN efforts of the GoN in the period before the royal killings by using the various books and online resources, personal experiences, recorded data and information and opinions of the experts collected in form of interview. It was difficult to analyze entire aspects of the insurgency and draw conclusions in comprehensive terms. Hence, the analysis was mainly focused on the effectiveness of principles of COIN used by the GoN on the basis of the COIN principles established by the US JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

The thesis has five chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject. The second chapter reviews the literature and highlights the research method. The third chapter prepares the platform for detailed analysis. The fourth chapter includes the findings and analysis, and the last chapter answers the thesis question and makes recommendations.

To answer the secondary research questions, the researcher first analyzed, in detail, the insurgency and COIN efforts of the GoN and identified the principles employed. There were some declared and some undeclared principles employed by the government during its effort to suppress and combat insurgency. The researcher first identified all of those principles and classified them in the above mentioned categories. The researcher then analyzed the COIN principles (declared or undeclared) used by the GoN in fighting against insurgency.

The government normally fights COIN operation based on some established principles; but it may not be successful all the time. It may be due to a different operating environment or incorrect methods of implementation. Hence, to fight a successful COIN, the state should use a carefully selected set of principles in most correct way with enough

resources for a long enough period of time. In case of Nepal, the government tried to fight based on some specific principles either declared or undeclared. Some principles were declared, but not employed on ground. The research determined the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of those principles based on the observation and analysis of experts in relative to each other.

Conclusion of Research Method

The research method was mainly based on the library research, personal focused group interview and researcher's own experience on the subject matter. The research was more qualitative and analytical. The following chapter intends to give a wider dimension of the Maoist issue in Nepal which helps to prepare a launching pad for the in depth analysis of the subject in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL

General

This chapter analyzed the socio-economic and political factors which led to the inception and quicker than anticipated development of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. This chapter's analysis led towards answering my Primary Research Question “Based on the principles of Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was the Nepalese Government’s COIN effort effective during the period 1996 to 2001 (up to the Royal Massacre)?” in the following chapter.

The root of the Communist movement in Nepal dates back to the birth of the CPN in 1949. Like other Communist parties around the world; ideological differences, personality clashes, splits, and reunions became a culture of Communists in Nepal.¹⁰⁵ However, the CPN played a significant role in overthrowing the “Rana Regime”¹⁰⁶ in 1950, but it could not rise as a major political party in the election held in 1959.¹⁰⁷

Other political parties, especially the NC, often accused the Communists of receiving support from the king. When King Mahendra took over state power on 15 December 1960, the general secretary of CPN Dr Keshar Jung Rayamajhi supported the

¹⁰⁵Thapa, “Radicalism and the Emergence of Maoism”, 21-37.

¹⁰⁶Nepal was ruled by Rana family for 104 years from 1846-1950. During this period, Nepal was totally closed from outside. Rana regime was overthrown by a joint movement comprising of NC, CPN supported by the King and newly independent India in 1950. For more details see, John Whelpton, *History of Nepal* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46-85

¹⁰⁷Thapa, “Radicalism and the Emergence of Maoism”, 27.

King's action terming it "a progressive step." Although the majority of the members of CPN rejected Rayamajhi's statement, and the party split on the same issue, this statement somehow supported the relationship between the King and Communists in Nepal. From this point forward, the disintegration of Communist groups accelerated and the Communist movement in Nepal got weaker.

CPN (Marxist-Leninist) was established in 1978 by some young leaders'.¹⁰⁸ It quickly grew in size and influence. During the "People's Movement" in 1990, seven Communist fractions formed ULF. The role of the ULF in the People's Movement to overthrow the "Panchayat System" and establishing a democratic system was a significant milestone in ushering the Communists as major political party.

Origin of the Maoists in Nepal

The Communist extremists maintained a separate identity from the ULF but played an active role in the Peoples' Movement of 1990. However, they were divided into a number of small groups. Among them, CPN-Unity Center was strongest and had fielded United People's Front (UPF) as a political front in the first general election in 1991 and became third largest party with 9 seats.¹⁰⁹ CPN-Unity Center was the mother party in the formation of CPN-M in 1995. The detail of the origin of CPN-M is shown in figure 2.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 34.

¹⁰⁹NC became the largest party with 110 seats, whereas CPN-UML became second largest party with impressive 69 seats out of total 205.




Figure 2. Origin of CPN-M

Source: Created by Author

Despite the presence of Communists in parliament, there was a great discontent between CPN-UML and extremist Communist parties including CPN-Unity Center. This

discontent was largely because the extremists wanted to abolish monarchy, elect a Constituent Assembly to draft a national democratic constitution and declare Nepal a republic. Hence, they kept on pushing their agenda but failed to make impact. In the midterm election in 1992, UPF failed to secure any seats. Following the election, they concluded that an armed struggle was the only option to influence the state of affairs. UPF boycotted the 1994 midterm election.¹¹⁰ In the meantime, CPN-Maoist was announced by combining the CPN-Unity Center and other small extremist Communist parties in 1995.

The political and economic conditions of Nepal were getting worse. The aspirations of the people were high after the political changes in 1990. Hence, managing a democratic change proved to be a burdensome task. Simply declaring the nation as democratic and promulgating a democratic constitution was not enough for the impoverished masses. The situation was further compounded by unemployment, lack of resources, inaccessible terrain, lack of dynamic political leadership and a hegemonic neighbor, India. All those factors prepared a suitable environment for the breakout of an insurgency.

The CPN-M continued to express its dissatisfaction with the existing constitution. The government simply neglected the demands of the CPN-M because it was not a big party. Consequently, the CPN-M boycotted all the political activities and processes, and started to threaten the government with the launching of an armed rebellion if its demands were not fulfilled. Further, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (one of the Maoist Party's

¹¹⁰Arjun Karki and David Seddon, *The people's war in Nepal: Left Prospective* (Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003), 17.

top leaders) submitted the “Forty Point Demands”¹¹¹ to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on 4 February 1996, and he demanded it be fulfilled by 17 February. The majority of demands were related to the livelihood of the people in remote areas of Nepal. But the government didn’t seriously consider any of the demands.

The Maoists, however, launched their offensive by attacking isolated police posts in Rukum, Rolpa, Gorkha and Sindhuli districts four days prior to the ultimatum date. “Maoists formally inaugurated their violent actions by attacking police stations in Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli on 13 February 1996. Thus the Maoist Peoples’ War commenced to liberate the so-called “suppressed people.”¹¹²

There are differing opinions on how and why the insurgency began. Some analysts blame the then incumbent rulers for failing to identify and politically address the aspirations of the Maoists. Other scholars blame the prevailing illiteracy, poverty and lack of good governance which they claim provided a supportive platform for the Maoist movement. Whatever caused the outbreak of insurgency, the Maoist leadership was highly effective in manipulating the deprived population to support its ideological objectives and strengthening their military and political fronts despite the unfavorable international conditions.

¹¹¹ Sudheer Sharma, “The Maoist Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective” in *Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion*, ed. Michael Hutt (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), 38-57.

¹¹² Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2001,” 58-78.

Development of Maoist Insurgency

Nepal has proved a fertile land for the Communist ideology for a very long time. The socio-economic and demographic structures to an extent favored Communism and gradually Maoism started to seem more appealing. The Maoists' insurgency preparation was very well coordinated. They gradually conducted a thorough ideological indoctrination, upgraded their military skills and capabilities. With little difficulty, they recruited (mostly through coercion) and transformed recruits into fighting and support tools for the attainment of their objectives. Additionally, they established a number of effective sister organizations and affiliations that were totally dedicated to their cause including: intellectual groups, laborers, students, workers and teachers functioning with utmost motivation to collect funds, spread ideas and propaganda, gather intelligence, accumulate war and food supplies and assist in new recruitment.

The Maoists' agenda was appealing. They simply targeted the 'hearts and minds' of the Nepalese masses. When they put forth their populist and emancipatory forty demands, Nepalese people in the rural areas perceived the Maoists as those that were genuinely fighting to forward the cause of the marginalized masses. During the insurgency, the Maoists introduced the United Revolutionary People's Council which was given the authority to introduce new policy and programs at the local level where their control had been established. The program included fundamental policies for agriculture, land reform, industry, finance, infrastructure development, culture, education, health, social welfare, caste, women, Dalits (oppressed Castes) etc. At the local level,

they conducted a number of populist programs such as “People’s Court,”¹¹³ collective farming, local education, local development programs and so forth.

Maoist involvement and support from various organizations played significant roles in the development of the Nepalese insurgency. The Maoists tried gaining wider support by organizing and mobilizing all available resources. Their involvement in the Coordination Committee of the Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)¹¹⁴ played an important role in increasing the Maoist influence. Another noteworthy aspect in the development of the Maoist Insurgency was the fact that the Maoists gained membership of the Revolution International Movement (RIM) which was an important source of moral support. They also received support from various Communist groups in India in the form of training, weapons and ammunitions, safe haven and other technical support. The “porous border”¹¹⁵ between the two nations made it easier for the Maoists to operate freely across the international boarder.

Pre existing Communist organizations and parties indirectly facilitated the rapid growth of the Maoist organization as their cadres were attracted to them. “. . . supporters of CPN-UML provided local leadership and cadres to the Maoist insurgency . . . without

¹¹³Maoist replaced existing legal system and courts in the areas of their influence and established their own ‘People’s Court’. People’s Court was a Maoist court where they conducted all legal procedures based on their political system.

¹¹⁴The Coordination Committee of the Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was an organization of Maoist Communist Parties of South Asia led by CPN-M. The broader objective was to consolidate the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) engulfing the continuous span of the leftist controlled territories of Nepal and India and obtain international recognition.

¹¹⁵Nepal and India share almost more than 1500 km of open boarder. There is no any physical barrier or control mechanism along the border. Cross boarder activities and movements are normal as the people share similar culture, tradition and language.

the pre-existing support groups and Communist activists already trained in Communist ideologies; it was difficult to imagine rapid spread of Maoists.”¹¹⁶ The Maoists employed all available opportunities to further their cause and strengthen their organization whereas the GoN failed to devise an effective strategy.

The Maoists placed an emphasis on certain basic deficiencies such as the lack of parity in representation and power sharing, devolution of power, basic needs, election of the Constituent Assembly, ethnicity, inclusiveness, transparency and federalism. Then there were certain other sensitized issues such as secularism, autonomous regions based upon ethnicity, rights guaranteed to the Madhesis as full-fledged Nepalese citizens, and the abolition of monarchy and proportional representation of various groups in the Nepal Army (NA) compromising quality and merit. All such demands were just to prepare the background for their armed struggle. History proves that violence has been primarily instrumental in introducing change in political culture and system in Nepal. “Maoist ideologues who believed only a violent movement could end the socio-economic ills of the country began the violent political campaign.”¹¹⁷ Yet, in reality, political ideologies have been used to gain support and recognition to capture power. Then, for the retention of the acquired power the ideology will remain subject to compromises.

One of the important factors for the development of Maoists was the use of terror against the local population. Although their leadership denied the use of terror against the

¹¹⁶Shisir Khanal, “Committed insurgents, a divided state and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in *Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal*, ed. Mahendra Lawoti (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2007), 75-94.

¹¹⁷Khanal, “Committed insurgents, a divided state and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 75-94.

population, they never took steps to prevent such actions. The repeated use of such tactics at lower levels forced neutrals from the local populace to support them, get killed, or flee from the village. Amnesty international, one of the influential Human Right organizations in its report of the year 2002 reported that the Maoist forces killed an estimated 800 civilians considered “enemies of the revolution,” with politicians and teachers a particular target. Amnesty accused the Maoists of torturing and murdering captives and taking hostages for ransom. It reported that the Maoists regularly recruited children into their ranks, operating a policy of “one family, one member” in areas under their control. Amnesty said it spoke to one 14-year-old girl who described children receiving weapons training at night after studying at school in the daytime.¹¹⁸

Perhaps the most important and decisive factor for the rapid growth and development of the Maoists in Nepal was the weakness of the state itself. Although the Maoists were exploiting the grievances of the people in the rural areas, using tactics of terror to alienate the government support, the state was helpless, uninterested and unenthusiastic to address the grievances of the population. The state almost had no response to neutralize the increasing Maoist effect in the rural areas, and the Maoists exploited this weakness to their favor.

Government COIN Efforts

It is difficult to develop a universal strategy, pattern or method of fighting against an opponent or enemy. It is more difficult in irregular warfare where the insurgents

¹¹⁸The Independent, “Nepal atrocities blamed on government and Maoists,” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nepal-atrocities-blamed-on-government-and-maoists-611527.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).

employ unconventional methods incorporated with new technology. However, various methods, theories and principles have been developed to combat insurgency based on the experiences of the past. The successful principles and methods in one scenario may or may not be effective in other places where the environment may be different. Hence, it requires a continuous modifications and revision from time to time on COIN principles, theories and methods.

Nepal was in a unique political situation when the Maoist insurgency began. The political freedom in the new environment also gave rise to an increase in peoples' expectations. The democratic rights and freedom became the primary source of social and political indiscipline among the people and politicians. The leaders of political parties were busy with their political interests and were utterly apathetic towards the peoples' aspirations. There was a lack of respect for other political parties. The King's powers were tempered by the new constitution. But the King remained influential and powerful because the Army was still under his command. In such a situation, none of the government agencies were prepared to deal with conflict at that point of time due to the unstable and unpredictable political environment.

In the initial stage, the political leaders and decision makers failed to identify the dynamics of the problem. Perhaps the political leaders did not comprehend the Maoist movement or because they simply refused to label it as a political problem. They totally ignored the issue even after the problem had become critical rather they simply regarded it as a minor law and order problem. Accordingly, the initial approach employed by Nepal to redress the Maoist problem was from a criminal justice perspective.

Even after the Maoist activities started to show clear indications of an insurgency, the government, the political parties/leaders and policy makers failed to define the problem. The political parties tried to use the Maoist issue for their political benefit. Of two main political parties, the NC and the CPN-UML,¹¹⁹ the one currently not in the government claimed the Maoist Problem as a political problem and demanded the government take political steps to address the issue. However, when either party was in power, it paid no attention to and did not address the problem but rather used the same criminal justice approach to deal with the Maoists by deploying police forces.

The police forces deployed to fight against the Maoists without a clear understanding of the problem and without proper equipment or training for COIN warfare. Additionally, those police forces involved in suppressing the Maoist insurgency were not trained in COIN warfare and concentrated on the “body count”¹²⁰ as a metric for success.

The police personnel in remote areas of Rolpa, Rukum¹²¹ were involved in looting, raping¹²² and other immoral activities. “The assault (police operation) was

¹¹⁹UML was largest Communist party in Nepal and it was one of the mainstreams Democratic Party in Nepal after political change in 1990.

¹²⁰The Police operation in the Mid-western part was concentrated on counting the dead bodies of Maoists to calculate its degree of success. However, it is blamed that most of those killed were innocents.

¹²¹Rolpa and Rukum are two districts of Mid-Western part of Nepal. The Maoist insurgency was started from the remote areas of these districts.

¹²²Robert Gersony in “The History and Dynamics of Nepal’s Maoist Revolt” claims that the operation Romeo, may have reinforced the negative image of Nepal’s police, but did not involve mass killings, rape, or property destruction. There were no documented cases of death in connection with the operation, and human rights sources described the incidents of police rape as a series of individual criminal acts rather than an

accompanied by human rights abuses, rape and torture against civilians. As a consequence about 6,000 people were displaced within Rolpa and to neighboring districts.”¹²³ The “Operation Romeo”¹²⁴ conducted by police to suppress the Maoist insurgency played a catalytic role in augmenting the Maoist organization in that area. The family members of those killed, looted and raped started to join the Maoist organizations leading to their rapid expansion and influence in the region. Hence, the Maoist armed rebellion, which began as a few militias and a handful of improvised weapons, quickly grew in overall magnitude and effectiveness.

The inability of successive governments to prepare and implement a clear national policy utilizing diplomatic, informational, military and economical (DIME) elements of national power rather facilitated the insurgency to escalate in scope and size. Hence, it is obvious that the concerned authorities failed to identify the problem in its initial phase because the state could not define the problem. This delay resulted in the lack of appropriate steps by the government. Compounding the problem was the lack of knowledge in COIN operations which led to a disorganized application of COIN principles that failed to produce the desired result.

attempt to systematically degrade the Magar race. Moreover, the People’s War, which clearly required an extended period of preparation, was declared just months after Operation Romeo began.

¹²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), “Nepal: Sustainability of IDP Returns Undermined by Lack of Assistance,” [http://sinope.activeweb.fr/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/3BCB29A3E6B71579C125746D002E819A/\\$file/Nepal+-+June+2008.pdf](http://sinope.activeweb.fr/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/3BCB29A3E6B71579C125746D002E819A/$file/Nepal+-+June+2008.pdf) (accessed 19 June 2008), 20.

¹²⁴ Police campaign “Operation Romeo” was conducted in November 1995 in Rolpa district (Mid-Western region) against Maoist.

Aftermath

After the assassination of King Birendra, his younger brother Gyanendra¹²⁵ became the king. He proved to be more ambitious and more of a hard liner than his brother. The Maoists were engaged in talks with the GoN when the King was assassinated. But soon after his assassination of the king, the Maoists abandoned the negotiation talks and attacked a Nepalese Army Company located at Dang in the Mid-Western part of Nepal. The government responded by declaring a “State of Emergency” and mobilizing the Army against the Maoists.

Before the emergency period, NA was only engaged in the ISDP. After the Army was mobilized, actions and counteractions intensified resulting in more casualties on both sides as well as deaths of innocent civilians. The overall impact of NA mobilization on COIN effort was not very fruitful for the GoN. In the initial stage, despite facing some setbacks, NA managed to put tremendous pressure on the Maoists. However, as the NA operation progressed; they started to lose popular support. The net result was that the Maoist strength started to grow faster than anticipated despite suffering heavy losses in terms of death, capture, surrenders and desertions.

The main reason for the failure of the NA’s COIN effort can be largely attributed to an overall lack of political support. The security forces essentially operated on their own without any political backing. The King taking power and sidelining the legitimate political parties only exacerbated the problem. “After the King, influenced by his self-serving advisors, took over political power, the RNA ironically seemed to be fighting

¹²⁵King Gyanendra was visiting some of the National parks outside the capital on the day of assassination. His wife and son were among few survivors in the firing.

against not only the insurgents but also all the major political parties, the media, academia, national and international human rights organizations and the international community.”¹²⁶ The net result was that the GoN lost its support. The security forces, particularly the NA, were the only government agency involved in GoN’s COIN effort with no support from political parties or the populace.

Despite all of these difficulties, RNA stood strong and prevented the Maoists from capturing the state authority. “The RNA had achieved its fundamental mission of forcing the Maoist insurgents to renounce their strategic military aim, thereby paving the way for a relatively more peaceful and manageable change in Nepal.”¹²⁷ In the absence of the RNA, nothing could have prevented the Maoist insurgents from capturing state power by brute force. Moreover, had the Maoist insurgents defeated the Army, the nature of changes, good or bad, would probably have been unimaginable in terms of violence, bloodshed and socio-economic and political upheavals leading to unavoidable external military interference.¹²⁸

However, the Maoists realized they could not achieve aim by military means and exploited the existing political situation. They were able to form a joint coalition with the political parties and launched the people’s mass movement against the King thereby forcing him to restore the dissolved parliament. The reinstated parliament ultimately abolished the King in 2006.

¹²⁶Ranadhoj Limbu Angbuhang, “Soldiers Sacrifice,” *The Kathmandu Post*, <http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/02/11/Oped/Soldiers-sacrifice/5060/>(accessed 12 February 2010).

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Ibid.

Conclusion

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal started in a unique situation for both the state and the Maoists. The Maoists exploited the weaknesses of the government as well as the King, and soon developed into a significant movement. It fought with the Army by exploiting the terrain and political condition of Nepal resulting in a military stalemate. When the state failed to counter the Maoist strategy, the Maoists could not achieve their objectives through military means and instead attained them through political maneuvering.

The chapter 4 carries out an in depth analysis of the GoN's effort to counter the Maoist insurgency from its initial stages up to the assassination of the King Birendra.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY

General

This chapter answers primary and secondary research questions through analysis of the collected information, facts and figures. The primary research question to be answered is “Based on the principles of the Joint Publication 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was the Government of Nepal’s COIN effort effective during the period 1996 to 2001 (up to the Royal Massacre)?” The secondary research questions to be answered are:

1. Did the Government of Nepal follow the COIN principles established by the US Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* to fight against the Maoist insurgency?
2. How were those principles implemented?
3. Which of them were sufficiently resourced?

Each of the COIN principles are discussed and analyzed on the basis of the library research, interviews conducted by the researcher, and the researcher’s personal experience. The researcher selected some experts on the issue and received opinions from eight experts from Nepal and the USA. The researcher incorporates the opinions and views of those experts expressed in email interviews.

To answer the primary and secondary research questions, it is necessary to analyze the political, social and economic situation of Nepal at the time of origin of the Maoist insurgency. At that time, Nepal was in a very fragile condition politically and economically. After establishment of the multi-party democratic system in 1990, the

aspirations of the population were high. The political parties played a main role in the formulation and execution of the state policy, but the parties and the leaders failed to address the increasing aspirations of the population. The parties and leaders were more concerned in their personal and party interests. “Politics was concentrated at the center in the game of government making and unmaking, the parliamentary parties grossly ignored the need for party building at the grassroots level. This was the most appropriate time for CPN-M to create its own space and territory for a long drawn out people’s war.”¹²⁹ This attitude of the political parties fueled the increasing dissatisfaction of the population against the existing political system which was exploited by the Maoists.

The outbreak of the Maoist insurgency was not unanticipated. Political and security experts warned the government of such possibility. The former Chief of Army Staff of the Nepal Army, General Rookmangad Katwal,¹³⁰ in his 1994 address to the newly selected officer cadets of the Military Academy, advised the officer cadets to be mentally prepared to fight a COIN war. Similar views were expressed by various military commanders and political leaders. Apart from that, the government formed various task forces and commissions which submitted similar conclusions to the government.

Despite the reports and warnings of various commissions and individuals, the state failed to realize the gravity of the situation and prevent it. In the initial stage, the government took it simply as a law enforcement problem and adopted a criminal justice approach. “When the leader of UPF, Baburam Bhattarai, presented 40-point demands to

¹²⁹Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2001,” 61.

¹³⁰General Katwal retired from NA in 2009 after serving three years as Chief of Army staff. In 1994, he was commandant of Nepalese Military Academy, Kharipati, Bhaktapur. The researcher was among the newly selected Officer Cadets.

the Prime minister in February 1996, the threat was largely ignored.”¹³¹ Even when the Maoist insurgency actually started with the attacks on the police posts in the remote areas of the Mid-Western region, the government failed to make correct assessments and take appropriate actions. “Then Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadka infamously proclaimed ‘The police Force would crush the so-called insurgency in four days.’”¹³²

The weak response of the state was due to the unhealthy competition and conflicting interests of the leaders. Even after the increase of the influence of the insurgency in the Mid Western Nepal, there were no appropriate steps from the state authority. “. . . the reaction of the state to the Maoist insurgency has been characterized by utter confusion, to the extent that even after six years of particularly destructive violence the government in Kathmandu had yet even to define the nature of the threat.”¹³³ Even when the Maoist problem took shape as an insurgency, they presented their own perspective to solve the problem. “Instead of giving specific policy inputs to counter the insurgency, most political parties put forward a vague mixture of their own general agendas and their recommendations.”¹³⁴ This approach of the political parties and the leaders provided a golden opportunity for the Maoists to increase their organization and influence.

¹³¹ Khanal, “Committed insurgents, a divided state and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 75-94.

¹³²Ibid., 80.

¹³³Shah, 192-224.

¹³⁴Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2001,” 63.

The COIN effort of Nepal was not specifically based on the COIN principles of JP 3-24. But interestingly, most of the principles were employed. To simplify the analysis, the GoN COIN effort is analyzed in detail on the basis of COIN principles established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. For the analysis, the principles will be divided into five different groups as already mentioned in research methodology.

Gain Support of Population

It is a widely accepted fact that the support of population is one of the significant factors for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Hence, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents fight for the support of the population. The following COIN principles will have direct impact on the population.

1. Political Factors are Primary

By the nature of conflict, the political factors are very important and should be given highest priority in COIN operations. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, emphasizes the political factors. On the method of resolving insurgency, joint doctrine emphasizes that there will be a political solution at some point. “Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution. Moreover, most solutions involve some sort of political compromise and are rarely a ‘winner takes all’ situation.”¹³⁵

Weakness of the governments under newly established democratic system was the main cause of outbreak of insurgency in Nepal. There was a democratically elected government in the time period 1990-2001, but it could not function effectively. This was one of the main causes of the outbreak of the Maoist insurgency. There was no doubt that

¹³⁵JP 3-24, III-13.

the Maoist's issue was a political problem, but there was a dispute among the political parties in defining it from the beginning.

Among the main political parties, CPN-UML always considered the Maoist issue a political problem and opposed using force against it due to its ideological proximity to the Maoists. But when UML was in government, it did virtually nothing to solve the issue or bring the Maoists into the political mainstream. UML, being one of the biggest and most influential political parties, did nothing apart from blaming the government for having the wrong approach or doing little to solve the issue.

NC has the biggest share of blame for the emergence of the insurgency. NC, the biggest and most influential political party, remained in power for most of the time after 1990 when the Maoist insurgency originated, developed and existed. The government led by NC leaders neglected the Maoist demands and concerns. They were more concerned with their political interests than with the Maoist demands. Most of the time, NC regarded the Maoist issue as criminal activities, and refused to accept it as a political problem. Because of this approach of the NC, the government decided to employ police to crush the Maoist activities by force.

The government policy of using police and actions of police during their operations is often blamed as the biggest factor for the faster growth of the Maoists. The police conducted operations to physically suppress the active insurgents, but these operations impacted the local population. There were no political programs to support the police operation. The impact of the police operation was that the overall strength of the insurgents increased faster than anticipated. "The Maoists drew their lifeblood from this (police) oppression, as 30% of respondents in a 2001 nationwide survey blamed police

brutally for the increase in Maoist activity, subordinating factors such as poverty, unemployment and corruption as secondary.”¹³⁶

As the Maoists started to get stronger, the government failed to counter it. The government chose to buy time rather than choosing immediate, harder military operations. To ensure the security of the government agencies, they started to evacuate from the Maoist dominated areas. “Instead of taking necessary measures to contain the Maoist threat, successive governments chose the easier path of simply vacating the areas contested by rebels.”¹³⁷ The overall result was that the Maoists enjoyed their freedom of action and developed their strong organization down to the grass root level.

The development of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was one of the fastest in the world. Most experts blame it on the inability of the government to identify the issue and take appropriate actions. Although the subsequent governments seemed to have failed to identify the issue, this was not the whole truth. The views expressed by the political leaders in various phases indicate that they had a clear perception of the issue, but they were pretending not to understand. The GoN led by Girija Prasad Koirala formed a high level commission to put appropriate recommendations. “The GoN having realized the seriousness of incidents relating to Maoist menace announced the establishment of a high-powered special committee on 1st December (1999) to look into the Maoist problem

¹³⁶Deepak Thapa, “Day of the Maoist,” http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/conflict_resolution/day_of_maoist.htm. In west Nepal, where the police actions have been most concentrated, 30 percent of the respondents attributed the rise of the Maoists to police high-handedness (The national average was 19 percent. On the other hand, 38 percent attributed it to poverty and unemployment, 17 percent to the Maoist ideology and 9 percent to fear of the Maoists).

¹³⁷Shah, 206.

and initiate a dialogue with them. The committee is to be chaired by former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.”¹³⁸

The announcement of the committee indicated that the government had some sense of the impending threat and slowly accepted the Maoist issue not just as a minor law and order problem, but as more than that. “The announcement of a high-powered committee to open a dialogue with the Maoists is a good sign. There is realization that it is just not a law and order problem but one having deeper ramifications affecting the social, economic and political fabric of remote regions of Nepal.”¹³⁹ However, when the Deuba Committee submitted its report, it was never implemented. It once again proved that the democratic government of Nepal, political parties and leaders were never seriously committed to solve the Maoist issue.

In conclusion, the GoN failed to employ this principle in fighting against the Maoist insurgency. The state and legitimate political parties failed to identify the political nature of the issue. They were more concerned with their own political benefits and interests. Even the security operations against the Maoists were in isolation without any political backing. The Maoists exploited the volatile and fluid political situation in Nepal to develop their organization and movement.

¹³⁸South Asia Analysis Group, “Nepal update: The Maoist menace continues,” <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers%5Cpaper94.html> (assessed 12 January 2010).

¹³⁹Ibid.

2. Legitimacy is the Main Objective

Legitimacy is one of the most essential factors which give the government moral and legal power. Support of the population is one of the important indicators of the legitimacy of the government, which encourages the government to fight in a COIN environment. The counterinsurgent should establish and maintain legitimacy by winning the confidence of the people, not by coercive means.

Soon after the start of the Maoist activities in the remote areas of the Mid-Western parts, they challenged the authority of the central government. They attacked the government offices and personnel serving on those areas. They took control of the state functions such as local courts, the criminal justice system, the schools, and so on to establish their authority. The Maoists tried to win the support of the people by carrying out popular activities like banning alcohol, gambling in local areas. Most significantly, they tried to establish their legitimacy by conducting elections at the local level.

In response, “the only major effort the Governments tried to do to strengthen their legitimacy was to hold the election on schedule. After 2001, they ignored this vital aspect (election) of Democracy as well.”¹⁴⁰ Most of the time “this (legitimacy) was never understood (by the Government) as an objective, because it would have required all concerned to focus upon corrupt, inefficient governance and service delivery as the heart of the matter. This would be asking Nepal’s chattering classes to deny their essence.”¹⁴¹ Rather than trying to establish its legitimacy by political means, the government decided

¹⁴⁰Ranadhoj Limbu Angbuhang (BG- Retired, NA), electronic correspondence by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 January, 2010.

¹⁴¹Thomas A. Marks, electronic correspondence by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 March, 2010.

to use the Nepal police to crack down on those activities and reestablish government authority and legitimacy. Nepal police were neither trained nor equipped to fight against an insurgency. They conducted various operations in the Maoist affected areas and as a result a number of police outposts were established. In villages where police conducted security operations, they captured and killed Maoist activists to establish the government authority in those areas. Police operations engaged the Maoists and established limited government authority in some areas, but failed to control the local population.

The repressive and heavy handed law and order measures were able to physically suppress the Maoist activities to some extent, but they had a more negative impact on the local population. They further alienated the local populace, which ultimately benefited the insurgents. The police operations established limited authority of the government in the initial stages but failed to establish legitimacy.

In conclusion, this was one of the unsuccessful COIN principles employed in Nepal. If the GoN had opted for local and district level elections, it would have been more effective and successful in establishing the legitimacy of the GoN. But the use of force and overdependence on the police further alienated the legitimacy of the government.

3. Security under the Rule of Law is Essential

Maintaining security and the rule of law are two contradictory things, especially in irregular warfare. The US joint doctrine accepts this fact. “It is a paradox of COIN that the increased use of force required to maintain order decreases the perceived legitimacy

of counterinsurgent actions.”¹⁴² However, it still emphasizes on avoiding illegitimate actions and evidence gathering for the support of the legitimate actions.

In dealing with the Maoist activities in Nepal, the Maoists and human right activists blame the police for a heavy-handed approach to suppressing the Maoist cadres. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai noted that “the people arrested range from 12 to 70 years of age and most of them have been subjected to inhuman torture while in police custody. An eighteen-year old girl from Gam Village Development Committee (VDC)¹⁴³ was raped in Sulichour police station; eight girls from Oowa Village Development Committee were stripped to nudity.”¹⁴⁴

The failure of police to maintain the rule of law assisted the Maoist insurgency. Insurgents took police operations as a starting point for their struggle against the government.¹⁴⁵ Maoists formally declared “the People’s war” in 1996, and their activities continued to increase in rural areas, which slowly displaced the government agencies. The government again decided to launch another large scale police operation in Mid-

¹⁴²JP 3-23, III-15, 16.

¹⁴³Nepal is administratively divided into 75 districts. Each district is divided into approximately 40-60 Village Development Committees. The VDCs are led by elected representatives.

¹⁴⁴*The Independent*, “Interview with Dr Baburam Bhattarai,” http://www.humanrights.de/doc_en/archiv/n/nepal/politics/131295_interview.htm (assessed 10 October 2009).

¹⁴⁵Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

Western Nepal. As per the decision, the government launched the “Kilo Sierra Two” operation in 1999 in an attempt to crush the guerrillas militarily.¹⁴⁶

The Nepal Police had conducted Operation “Kilo Sierra Two” in 18 districts of the country for one year. Although the police do not have any official accounts of the existence of any such operation, from mid 1998 onwards, the killings of the Maoist supporters escalated to the highest point. During the operation, the police conducted heavy-handed search and arrest operations and killed and captured some insurgents, but they alienated a large part of public through harsh and repressive measures, which resulted in some civilian deaths. During that operation, many peasants were killed, helicopters tracked down rebels in the countryside, and government agents raided some newspapers and censored or banned other publications. Yet the rebels survived and even gained ground in the year following the operation.

For over a year following “Kilo Sierra Two,” the government response to the guerrillas was in the hands of local police. Since then, the Nepali government has come under increasing scrutiny from the international community for human-rights abuses. Asia Week reported that the reaction of the police to the CPN-M has taken the form of “summary round-ups and executions of suspects and a curious absence of wounded Maoists after clashes.” “Previous operations such as the one code-named ‘Kilo Sierra

¹⁴⁶There is debate over the real meaning of “Kilo Sierra (KS)”. Many people say that “KS” stands for “Search and Kill,” however, the government and police never made a formal declaration of its meaning.

Two' last year cost the government local support," added The Nepali Times. "Even party politicians in Kathmandu are unwilling to stick their necks out in support."¹⁴⁷

The overall impact of the police operation was that the police failed to operate under the rule of law, which had negative impact on the overall image of the government. It resulted in another failed COIN principle in the government effort against the Maoist insurgents.

4. Manage Information and Expectations

For an effective action against any insurgency, the support of the people is the most important factor. Keeping the people informed about the state affairs is a key for the government to maintain expectations, prevent discontent, and create a sense of ownership of the government among the people. Managing expectations also involves showing economic and political progress as part of the campaign to show the populace how life is improving. In the end, the people must be convinced that their lives will be better with the counterinsurgent in control rather than with the insurgent in control.¹⁴⁸

IO is a key tool for achieving such objectives. Governments should avoid making unrealistic promises. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷Peter Santana, "The People's War?" *Harvard International Review*, <http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=997> (assessed 12 January 2010).

¹⁴⁸Cohen et al., "Principles, Paradoxes, and Imperatives of Counterinsurgency."

¹⁴⁹JP 3-24.

In Nepal, “there were no programs to mobilize popular will.”¹⁵⁰ The political parties were divided and had very inconsistent policy and hence failed to manage the expectations of the population. The lack of unity among the political parties prevented the state to formulate any concrete plan and policy. “The extreme disunity within the ruling circles prevented the Nepali state from articulating a clear, consistent and convincing response during the most critical phase of Nepal’s history.”¹⁵¹ The rivalry and popular slogans of the political parties played significant role in increasing the expectations of the population beyond the capability of the government. The political parties not in power always tried to expose the weaknesses of the government and motivated the population to make a number of demands which the government was surely unable to fulfill.

The Maoists had an effective IO campaign and exploited the rift between political parties and the king. They enhanced the expectation of the people to a level that was not possible to reach in the existing system. This gradually and unknowingly weakened the monarchy and the political parties. They promised the population a number of popular programs like “Collective farming,”¹⁵² “Land to those who work on it (Jasko Jot, Usko Pot),”¹⁵³ civic actions, “no pay government debts”¹⁵⁴ and so on.

¹⁵⁰Marks, Interview.

¹⁵¹Shah, 206.

¹⁵²It is a Communist style farming where a group people collectively own a piece of land, work together and share the production. There is no individual ownership.

¹⁵³Landlords used to own a large amount of land but the poorer had less or no land. So, the person with lots of land allowed other people to work on his land in some sort of contract. However, the Maoists apparently announced that the people who are working on the big landlord’s land should get the ownership of that land for no cost. This plan attracted lots of landless people towards the Maoists.

In conclusion, it was another ineffective COIN principle in Nepal. The government failed to manage the expectations of the population or to counter the Maoist IO. It also failed to employ appropriate military strategy. “The then government and parties fooled themselves by not bringing out the army in time to nip the insurgency in the bud.”¹⁵⁵ “In the absence of conceptual clarity among the ruling elites, public security deteriorated rapidly, even as the Maoists consolidated their organization and military assets at a brisk pace between 1996 and 2001.”¹⁵⁶

Understand and Continue to Assess

Understanding the operational and overall environment is most important to drive the COIN operation in right the direction. It will be difficult and challenging for the counterinsurgent because the environment keeps on changing. Hence, the counterinsurgent should have a sound and effective mechanism to develop an accurate understanding of the situation so as to be able to formulate a workable strategy against the insurgents. The COIN principle “Counterinsurgents must understand the Operational Environment (OE)” illustrated in JP 3-24 emphasizes this aspect.

¹⁵⁴This was another popular announcement by the Maoists in an effort to win the support of local population. They announced/ordered to local population not to pay any form of taxes like land tax, property tax, electricity taxes and so on. Though it was not a practical one, it raised the Maoist support among local population.

¹⁵⁵Angbuhang, “Strategic Myopia.”

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

5. Counterinsurgents must Understand the Operational Environment (OE)

Unless the counterinsurgent understands the overall nature of the conflict, he cannot formulate a suitable strategy against it. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, establishes the understanding of the operational environment as the most important and first COIN principle. Hence, for the counterinsurgent, understanding of every aspect of the society which has influence in the conflict is very important.

In Nepal, the state did have an understanding of the local situation, socio-political situation and other factors, but failed to understand and evaluate its own political vulnerability. It was mainly due to a lack of understanding or a reluctance to understand the nature of insurgency. Most of the political leaders had little or no understanding of the nature and dimensions of the insurgency. Even if they understood it, their political interests forced them to do otherwise. Though experts warned the government of such a possibility, they failed to apply enough pressure or to present a concrete picture of such a possibility. Although the high ranking commanders of the security forces were aware of such a possibility, they failed to put solid recommendations and pressure on the government.

The political leaders never tried to understand the core issue. The worst thing in Nepal was that even if the political leaders' understood the complex dynamics of the issue, they pretended otherwise due to their own political interests. Because of this attitude, the state failed to formulate an appropriate policy. ". . . Maoist activities rapidly expanded . . . the reason for this was the government's failure to diagnose the problem properly, and as a consequence its response to the Maoists became the subject of bitter

criticism.”¹⁵⁷ Even after the effect of insurgency became severe in the Mid-Western region, the responsible personnel continued to depict the situation as a simple law and order problem. “Official pronouncement continued to describe the Maoist insurgency variously as a simple law and order problem; as a socio-economic malaise; as terrorism; or as just another political issue.”¹⁵⁸

In the subject of defining the issue, the political parties and leaders were divided into two distinct parts. One thought it a political issue; the other thought it a criminal one. But both tried to use it to fulfill their own interests. The approach of the main political parties and the leaders indicated that they did not want to solve the problem. “As the state was not serious about the Maoist issue, they completed preparation of the armed insurgency by keeping the government unaware, in order to avoid government repression.”¹⁵⁹ As the situation started to deteriorate, the government decided to use police force to crush the Maoist movement.

To conclude, the government and political parties in Nepal simply ignored the possible impact of the Maoist problem due to a lack of understanding of the environment. The government could have prevented the outbreak of the insurgency if the government had developed an understanding of the situation. Even after the outbreak of the insurgency, the state and the political parties failed to develop the operational

¹⁵⁷Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2001,”62.

¹⁵⁸Shah, 93.

¹⁵⁹Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

environment. This led to a failure in the formulation of appropriate government policy and ultimately failure of the overall COIN effort of the GoN.

Effective Civil and Military Planning

Insurgency is a political problem and needs a political solution at some point in time, for which the military is least suited. In most COIN operations, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents fight for the support of the population. Military means only may not be sufficient for winning the support of the population. Similarly, political or economic plans and projects by themselves may not be sufficient to defeat motivated armed insurgents. Hence, a unified civil-military effort is necessary. The following COIN principles in JP 3-24 emphasize joint civil and military planning.

6. Unity of Effort is Essential.

On the significance of unity of effort during COIN operations, JP 3-24 states, “. . . well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN.”¹⁶⁰ Hence, it is imperative that all the forces and agencies involved in carrying out COIN activities in a given area to operate under a unified command structure to produce a desired result.

The COIN effort of GoN lacked unity of effort at all levels. “The government’s response to the Maoists has never been unified and all parties attempt to politicize the

¹⁶⁰JP 3-24, III-13.

matter to their own ends. Some even stand to gain from a protracted flight.”¹⁶¹ Thomas A. Marks, an American expert on Maoist Insurgencies, argues, “Unity of effort was never achieved, even after direct royal rule was instituted, because contending centers of power within the Nepali polity refused to sacrifice their individual prerogatives to the necessities of war fighting (and, one might argue, survival).”¹⁶² Similar views were expressed by some high ranking government officials. “When the country enters into emergency or goes to war the nation as a whole must support the security forces. It was not the case in Nepal.”¹⁶³

The operations conducted by the Nepal police failed to bring out desired result for the government because they were not integrated with political and economic plans. “The police force was badly defeated in the countryside and was slowly vacating large parts of the countryside. The Government was not ready for the next step, whereas Maoists were enjoying gains against the police forces in rural areas.”¹⁶⁴ This happened because the government tried to implement its own ideas which other political parties and leaders did not like. The government and police operation could not get support from other parties, people and from other government agencies.

¹⁶¹Chitra K. Tiwari, “The people’s war: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Nepal/PeoplesWar_MaoistInsurg.html (accessed 20 February 2010).

¹⁶²Marks, Interview.

¹⁶³Balananda Sharma, electronic correspondence by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25 January, 2010.

¹⁶⁴Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

Lack of unity of effort also hampered implementation of political and economic plans. For example, the ISDP was successful and effective initially in some of the areas, but could not continue and maintain its effectiveness. Despite having good intentions, ISDP came under scrutiny because of political rivalry between the political parties. It was largely an army initiated program, which is why it was not well accepted in partisan politics. The concept of ISDP was generally misunderstood and did not reach various governmental agencies.¹⁶⁵ “The opposition CPN-UML and a coalition of left parties, however, distanced themselves from the program. They cited the need for dialogue as the Maoist problem is a political problem.”¹⁶⁶ So the ISDP could not earn political and popular support from the political parties and local population.

In conclusion, Nepal failed to maintain “Unity of Effort” in its COIN effort. It led to the failure and ineffectiveness of overall COIN operations of the government. Most of the time, the security forces alone were combating the insurgency, whereas the political parties and all other government and non-government agencies were indifferent to the ongoing events. A lone military element was struggling to counter the insurgents, and became more isolated when the King took over. The relative ineffectiveness of the above mentioned government initiatives clearly indicate the lack of unity of effort among the various government agencies.

¹⁶⁵Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

¹⁶⁶Limbu, “Nepal makes inroads in Maoist struggle.”

7. Counterinsurgents should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

War against insurgency is naturally a long war. The insurgents always try to drag the conventional forces into a long war of attrition to overcome the material superiority of the counterinsurgents. “To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.”¹⁶⁷ So it is necessary for the counterinsurgent to be mentally, physically and materially prepared to fight a long war and have a long term commitment.

Long term commitment was perhaps one of the most critical missing pieces of the Nepalese COIN effort on the part of both the government and the security forces. The government and political parties never considered it as a serious political problem. The main reason for this was the political instability and lack of resources. After the political change in 1990, the frequent change of government in Nepal in a short duration of time became a normal phenomenon due to unstable, weak and changing political alliances. The political parties and leaders adopted an approach of “power at any cost and any way”. The major political parties and leaders also tried to use the Maoist issue for their own political interest. S.D. Muni argues that under the multi-party democratic system, political parties and the palace became two main power centers. However, both adopted short-sighted approaches to serve their respective narrow political vested interests, thus creating conditions for the Maoists to build themselves as a formidable political force.¹⁶⁸

Another significant factor which prevented the government from preparing for long-term commitment was the lack of resources. The area where the insurgency started

¹⁶⁷T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 193.

¹⁶⁸Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The challenges and Responses*, 41.

was economically far behind the government. The Maoists especially exploited the economic grievances of the people, to which the government would have to commit a large amount of money and resources. The GoN lacked resources even to run regular routine business and was unable to mobilize additional resources. Even the small amount of available resources was not properly utilized due to existing corruption and the “self interest of special interest groups.”¹⁶⁹

Due to the approach of the political parties and leaders, the government failed to formulate specific policies against the Maoist insurgency. The lack of resources and political instability prevented the government from formulating an effective long term plan. Even the limited resources were not properly utilized due to lack of strong mechanisms and political interest from some of the influential political leaders. The security forces were the only elements of the government fighting against the insurgency, but they lacked the required support from the political front. This had a severe impact on the security forces involved in combating the Maoist insurgency. The Government had no other plan except using police, and the police had no other plans and skills except using force.

In conclusion, it was another failed COIN principle in Nepal. The political instability and rivalry among the various political parties prevented the state from formulating long-term economic, political and military plans for fighting against the

¹⁶⁹The government budget allocated to some area, where it was necessary, was often diverted to some other area of the interest of some leaders and individuals having influence. The main reason of such diversion of funds was to “protect the vote bank” of the leader. This is why; the area with weak leaders and less economic development always got bypassed in economic and other development.

Maoist insurgency. Even when such a plan was formulated, it could not continue as the new government completely neglected programs of the previous government.

8. Empower the Lowest Levels

The COIN, to be successful, should be able to impact the people on the lowest rung in the society. Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of force and ROE.¹⁷⁰ Successful decentralized execution results from exercise, by subordinate leaders at all echelons, of disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions.¹⁷¹ The US joint doctrine emphasizes initiative by commanders at all levels for success in COIN operation.

Nepal was governed in a highly centralized political system since its establishment. All the power and economic resources were centralized in the capital city. A similar type of administrative structure was established down to the district level. The lowest level of administrative structure was VDC, but it had very limited authority. VDC had normally very small and insignificant economic resources, so it had to rely on the district or central government for almost everything. As a result, the people in the villages had almost no say in development activities and had to depend on the central government for everything. This resulted in the lowest administrative structure having no power.

When the GoN decided to fight against the Maoist insurgency, it could not decide which institution/ administrative structure needed to be empowered and how. The first

¹⁷⁰JP 3-24, III-18.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 18.

respondent against the COIN was Nepal police, the local administration and the central government itself. Perhaps in the initial phase, Nepal police was the most empowered institution down to lowest level. Although the legal provision restricted the police to conduct a wide range of COIN activities, government had given it a free hand. This was a sort of empowerment, but it proved to be wrong. Police used the authority to subdue the insurgent activities in incorrect ways which ultimately backfired.

The local representative bodies, which could be the most effective and influential in counterinsurgency, were very weak. The elected representatives were dissolved by the government, and the government failed to conduct the election to elect a new set of representatives. This proved to be fatal for the government. Due to the lack of elected representatives, there was nobody to represent the government and maintain legitimacy of the state down to the local level.

In conclusion, the GoN failed to identify the right institutions at the lowest level. The political organization which was present in the form of VDC could have been more important and effective if it was properly utilized and empowered. But the government decided to employ and empower the police instead. The police alone could not have succeeded in addressing a broad range of issues even if it was well trained. But in the absence of proper training and direction, it had a rather negative impact on the overall government COIN effort.

9. Learn to Adapt

Normally COIN and other forms of irregular warfare are the most difficult for governments and militaries to address. It is mainly due to their complexity, changing nature and unpredictability. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political

phases and tactics. However, skillful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents.¹⁷² Hence the counterinsurgents must be able to learn from their activities and adapt quickly changing situations. Commanders must develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command.¹⁷³

The GoN and its agencies completely failed to learn and adapt. In the initial stage, the question of learning and adapting largely did not occur beyond removing police posts from regions that were threatened.¹⁷⁴ Apart from the Army, other agencies had even less understanding about the nature of insurgency. Subsequently, NA trained the police and other agencies on COIN, but it was not enough. The GoN failed to learn lessons from the ineffectiveness of police operations and devise new strategies or look for other options available. “The Government learnt too late too little. It happened to be ‘penny wise, and pound foolish.’”¹⁷⁵ The government administrative and security agencies were in a state of confusion on how to start and from where to start.

The GoN could have used the NA to crush the insurgency in the beginning or when the Maoists were weak, but the lack of confidence between the King and the political parties prevented this option. However, when finally GoN decided to deploy NA, it was too late because the Maoists by that time grown enough strong to weather a NA offensive. “Instead of timely mobilization of the Army, the Government distrusted

¹⁷²Ibid.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Mahendra Lawoti, electronic correspondence by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 February 2010.

¹⁷⁵Angbuhang, Interview.

the RNA and raised the Armed Police Force under the Home Ministry. When the RNA was mobilized, it was very late.”¹⁷⁶

Major factors preventing learning and adapting again were the lack of understanding of the operational environment and the reluctance to understand. This was due to self interest or the political interest of the parties and leaders, as well as a lack of confidence and understanding among the political parties and other stake holders. Because of all those situations, GoN failed to formulate specific governmental policy on the Maoist problem. The agencies operated without any specific policy of the government. Whenever some policies and programs were established by the GoN, they did not last long due to frequent changes of government.

Similar problems were seen down to the tactical level. The police had no long term plan for fighting against the Maoists. The security forces were fighting a reacting battle and had no offensive or pre-emptive plan.¹⁷⁷ This was mainly due to a lack of clear policy guidelines. Although the army had a makeshift COIN doctrine, it was not guided or established by national COIN policy.

In conclusion, the government and its various agencies failed to learn from their mistakes and successes. This problem was seen from tactical level to the highest level and from civilians to all security organizations. All types of institutions lacked institutional memory, a sense of urgency and responsibility. Everybody looked for immediate problems and short term solutions. This led to the failure of the COIN effort.

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

¹⁷⁷Sharma, Interview.

10. Intelligence Drives Operations

Intelligence is perhaps the most important element in the conduct and success of any tactical operation. It is equally or more important for strategic and operational decision making. JP 3-24 emphasizes the importance of intelligence in COIN operations. “In all cases corroboration of the information retains significant importance to prevent acting upon false, misleading, or circular reporting. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable operational tempo, drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level.”¹⁷⁸

The intelligence network in Nepal was very weak and failed to fulfill the minimum requirement of the government. This was mainly because the lack of confidence in the intelligence organization by the politicians.¹⁷⁹ National Investigation Department, Intelligence Wing of Police, and Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of NA were the three main intelligence departments in Nepal. However, all those organizations lacked support from the government in terms of resources and other necessary support. Intelligence was never a priority of the government security agenda. Most importantly, they lacked the confidence of the government, political parties and leaders.

There was a lack of confidence between the GoN and intelligence agencies. The outburst of the Maoist insurgency was not unexpected. A number of security experts and

¹⁷⁸JP 3-24, III-14.

¹⁷⁹Before 1990, GoN had a strong and effective intelligence organization and network but it was mainly used for spying the opposition political activities mainly against NC and CPN-UML. Due to this, the intelligence organization never gained confidence of the mainstream political parties after the political change in 1990 and they gradually became less and less effective, and dysfunctional.

the reports of various commissions warned the government, policy makers and the political parties of such possibilities. Even the intelligence organization had enough indicators of the possible insurgency. --The intelligence organizations and all of these other sources failed to persuade the government of such a possibility and the government did not care about the warnings of intelligence agencies.

When the security forces were fighting against the insurgents, the intelligence organizations were horrible in their capability of collecting and analyzing the tactical intelligence. The intelligence organizations had neither sufficient source on the ground, nor the capacity to analyze and integrate the limited information acquired from various sources. To make the situation worse, there was no coordination among the three intelligence organizations, which were instead engaged in unhealthy competitions.

In summary, the GoN had a very low priority on intelligence; hence the intelligence organizations in Nepal were severely weakened. The intelligence organizations had much less capability in terms of information collection, almost no capability to analyze and integrate collected information. The very worst part was they lacked coordination and were engaged in unhealthy competition among themselves.

In conclusion, lack of intelligence was one of the significant causes of failure at the operational and tactical levels. It was mainly due to weaknesses of the intelligence organizations. State and political leaders did not realize the importance of intelligence. Even when they realized it, it was too late to develop the efficiency of such organization. The most important thing was that the state lacked the necessary economic resources to strengthen the intelligence organization. Hence, the government failed to implement the intelligence needed to drive its COIN operation.

Gain Control of Insurgents

Gaining a control over the insurgents is one of the important aspects of a COIN operation. It may be physical or psychological control which prevents them from contacting the local population or the sources of their international support. Gaining such a control over the insurgents is not easy. It requires a major effort. The following COIN principles of JP 3-24 aim at gaining control over the insurgents:

11. Insurgents Must be Isolated from
their Cause and Support.

Joint doctrine emphasizes isolating the insurgents from their cause and support. Skillful counterinsurgents can deal a significant blow to an insurgency by expropriating its cause. On means and methods of isolating, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, suggests isolating them by cutting logistics, reducing finances and maintaining momentum of the COIN activities.¹⁸⁰ It also argues that as the government increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to assist the counterinsurgents more actively.¹⁸¹

Though late, the government tried to launch some economic plans and programs to win the support of the population. As a part of wider government response to the Maoist issue, the then RNA was deployed in some of the Maoist affected areas to implement security and development related ISDP.¹⁸² “Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, who has been trying to initiate the plan since December (2000), finally got a

¹⁸⁰JP 3-24, III-14, 15.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²The plan was said to be conceived from the American Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan that was executed in Vietnam. It, however, could not continue after November 2001 offensive and was suspended.

breakthrough when he received the backing of King Birendra last month (April), following increased violence and skirmishes involving Maoists in various parts of the country.”¹⁸³ The basic idea was to use the army to create space for government, political parties and non-governmental organizations to go back and work to win back the people by serious development efforts that have a quick and tangible effect on local standards of living.¹⁸⁴

The intention of the ISDP was to launch limited security operations simultaneously with “winning the hearts and minds” through developmental projects. Initially, the RNA had planned to be mobilized as a part of the ISDP in the epicenter of the Maoist Movement–Rolpa, Rukum, Pyuthan, Salyan and Jajarkot in 1997. “The 400 million rupee (US\$5.33m) plan involves building roads, carrying out development work in Maoist areas, and will be protected by a 10,000-strong army deployment headquartered in the mid-western district of Surkhet.”¹⁸⁵

The ISDP has also caused apprehension among some development workers who feared it might upset the calm that had returned to the areas where a beleaguered police force had pulled out and where the Maoists were in total control.¹⁸⁶ There was also doubt on the GoN’s commitment and seriousness to planning and executing the ISDP in the long run. One of the retired high ranking officers of the NA claimed that a plan was

¹⁸³Ramyata Limbu, “Nepal makes inroads in Maoist struggle,” *Asia Times*, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CE25Df01.html> (accessed 19 November 2009).

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

projected with the title Internal Security and Development. Later it was declared a Civil Military National Campaign Plan was prepared. However, no plans were ever prepared for implementation.

In conclusion, the GoN was partially successful in isolating the Maoists in the initial phase. The ISDP plan had shown some positive indications initially. The police were also somehow successful in controlling the activities of the Maoists. ISDP would have been effective in isolating the insurgents and could have contributed effectively in GoN's COIN effort, but there was lack of commitment on the part of government. The police operation should have been supported by political and economic programs.

12. Use the Appropriate and Adequate Level of Force

Use of an appropriate and adequate level of force is very important in dealing with an insurgency. The counterinsurgent should always employ superior forces to maintain pressure on the insurgents and retain the initiative. However, great care should be taken to prevent civilian casualties and collateral damage. Normally, counterinsurgents can use rules of engagement (ROE) to minimize potential loss of life. ROE should address lesser means of force when such use is likely to create the desired effects and security forces can do so without endangering themselves, others, or mission accomplishment.¹⁸⁷

Any use of force generates a series of reactions; it may be more severe against the government authority. It is therefore advisable to use the minimum possible force. At

¹⁸⁷JP 3-24, III-18.

times, an overwhelming effort is necessary to intimidate an opponent or reassure the populace, but the amount of force and who wields it should be carefully calculated.¹⁸⁸

The GoN always failed to use appropriate and adequate level of force against the Maoist insurgency. When the Maoist insurgency started in 1996, it started with almost nothing. It had no modern weapons, no trained fighters and even its support base was not significant. The party organization of the Maoists was negligible. Nobody could imagine that it would grow as a significant movement. In the year 1999 the police commander responsible for the Mid Western region of Nepal said, “There are about one company (about 150) hardcore fighters in the Maoist. If we want round up and destroy them, the issue will be finished.”¹⁸⁹ He was probably right in his assessment. In such conditions, the government decided to use a 50,000 strong police force.

In the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency, Nepal police had enough strength in terms of number to fight against it. Although the police had hundreds of other responsibilities, given the strength and quality of the Maoist fighters; police still could spare a significant force. In this respect, the force level was not less in terms of number. In terms of weapons, the Maoists had very few primitive bolt action rifles and some homemade guns. The weapons and equipments the police had that time, though very old and insufficient, were far superior to the Maoists. But the main weakness in the part of government was the lack of strong political commitment and sound policy guidelines; as

¹⁸⁸Cohen et al., “Principles, Paradoxes, and Imperatives of Counterinsurgency.”

¹⁸⁹The researcher was public relation officer for an infantry battalion in Nepalganj of Mid Western Nepal. The police commander expressed such view in an informal talk with the researcher.

well as a lack of training and motivation on the part of Nepal police. Due to the lack of policy guidelines, the police operation became heavy-handed and had a negative impact.

Use of the army could have been the most effective step for the GoN to suppress the insurgency in the initial phase. Some of the experts suggested it. But the government and the political parties were not bold enough to use the army against the Maoists in a constitutional way.¹⁹⁰ Instead they pointed fingers towards others for their failure. When the government finally decided to mobilize the army, it was already too late. “It was only when the Maoists insurgents had become strong enough to attack and overrun the military camp (Dang, 23 November 2001) that the government declared emergency and mobilized the Army. By then, however, it was almost too late.”¹⁹¹

In conclusion, GoN was not incorrect in applying the Nepal police to control the Maoist insurgents in the initial phase given their strength and influence. The Nepal police had enough force and equipment, but lacked training, expertise and proper political and economic planning to support police operations.

Struggle for External/International Support

International support for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents is very important. Normally an insurgency occurs in a poor and underdeveloped country which

¹⁹⁰Many blamed the NA for not cooperating with the government, particularly during the Maoist's attack at Dunai; headquarter of Dolpa district in September 2000. IN another incident, the then Prime Minister resigned blaming the NA of betrayal on Holeri incident where the Maoist guerrillas took 76 police in hostage on July 12, 2001. But in all the cases, the government did not fulfill the constitutional requirement for mobilizing the army. This somehow indicates that the government was not determined to mobilize the army against the Maoists.

¹⁹¹Angbuhang, “Strategic Myopia.”

already may have a number of socio economic and political problems. The economic resources will be inadequate to address the grievances of the population.

The international support from most of the countries was accompanied by various terms and conditions which impacted their continuity and effectiveness. The US could have been a great support but “the US could not make up its mind what it really wanted to do to assist Nepal. Pre-2001, it did little meaningful.”¹⁹² Thomas A. Marks argues that “There were few if any US officials in-country who had any direct experience with counterinsurgency and so they could not give viable advice or support.”¹⁹³

The most needed and significant international support to assist Nepal in fighting against the insurgency could have been that of India. Nepal shares a long open border with India which the Maoists exploited. A number of people blame India’s double role in Nepal during the Maoist insurgency. Most of the Maoist leadership operated from various places of India, but India never tried to prevent this. Although India supported Nepal with both lethal and non-lethal support, many point out that India took a soft approach to the Maoists. Some people even blame India for clandestinely supporting the Maoists in conducting the insurgency. That means India supported both the GoN and the Maoists to fulfill its own political interests. “By supporting and supplying both sides of the civil war in Nepal, New Delhi has perfected the imperial art of divide and rule.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹²Marks, Interview.

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Shah, 196.

The Maoists collaborated with various Communist organizations in India which helped to fulfill their military needs. “The Maoists likewise gained a decisive military edge from their collaboration with the Indian state.”¹⁹⁵

In conclusion, Nepal failed to secure the confidence of its international partners in gaining political and military support. Most importantly, Nepal failed to convince and gain political and military support at the optimum level from adjoining neighbors. Most importantly, GoN failed to prevent the Maoists from gaining support in terms of political, military, economic support and safe haven from various organizations across the border. If Nepal had succeeded in gaining support for itself and preventing the Maoists to get such support, the COIN effort would have been much more effective.

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal broke out in a difficult situation for both the state and the Communists in mid 1990s. However, it quickly developed both politically and militarily in one of the unique examples in Communist history. The Government of Nepal (GoN) had made some significant COIN efforts in the initial stage but it could not continue in the long run to defeat the insurgency. By 2001, the Maoists outmaneuvered the Police and the state authority in most areas. They cleverly kept the King and the army separate from the initial conflict that would have been decisive. Later when they decided to take on the Nepal Army, they failed to defeat it militarily. However, politically they outmaneuvered the state, the King and were able to achieve most of their demands after Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006.

The active form of the Maoist insurgency ended with that 2006 agreement. The approximately two-and-a-half century old monarchy was abolished by peaceful political process. A Constitutional Assembly election was held in 2008 in which the CPN-M emerged as the largest political party and led a coalition government for a brief period of about 10 months. However, the whole issue is not yet completely solved and about 20,000 Maoist fighters are still inside various cantonments under United Nations supervision. This force is still a significant factor which favors the CPN-M in political bargains and helps them to achieve their political ends. Hence, unless those fighters are completely disbanded, the threat remains and the insurgency cannot be considered as having ended.

There is no doubt that the COIN effort of the GoN led by political parties (Nepali Congress and CPN-UML) in the initial period was weak. It was because the GoN could not or did not identify it as a political problem. However, as time passed, the government widened its efforts in terms of use of force and also socio-economic and political programs to win the support of the population. Although the GoN did not have any specific set of COIN principles, the GoN tried to employ many of the COIN principles established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

Political instability was the biggest factor which caused the state response to be weak. “Without political stability and firmed political leadership, broad based COIN operation is difficult to envisage and conduct.”¹⁹⁶ COIN efforts of the GoN faced similar problems. Despite all its efforts, COIN effort in Nepal was never strong due to political instability and diverging political interests of the political parties. “The state approach to grievances was wholly tactical. There was no appreciation for the degree to which ‘dysfunctional democracy’ was itself producing the opposition which took the tangible form of ‘the Maoists.’”¹⁹⁷ The result was that the GoN failed to formulate a policy to deal with the Maoist issue, and failed to appropriately employ the elements of national power.

The state lacked experience and institutional memory in dealing with the insurgency. “The developing nation’s institutional shortcomings during the transitional period and lack of internal conflict management mechanism create a huge friction in the

¹⁹⁶Khatri, “An Analysis of Nepalese Government’s Counterinsurgency Operations.”

¹⁹⁷Marks, Interview.

government leadership and machinery.”¹⁹⁸ Although Nepal had some experience in dealing with internal conflict, it was never documented. None of the state organs were ready to face a conflict. When there was a real threat, the state had no idea of what to do.

Despite all those facts, the GoN did conduct its COIN operation. Unlike other COIN operations, it was mainly led by the security forces and surprisingly many of COIN principles established by JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* were employed. Not all of them were effective; in fact, none of them were very effective in the long term. The GoN initially had limited success in gaining control of the insurgents but failed in other aspects, i.e., understanding and assessing, gaining control of population and effective civilian and military planning. Another aspect where the GoN failed was in the prevention of foreign support to the Maoists and gaining international support for the government itself.

Failure in gaining support of the population was the biggest weakness of the GoN COIN effort. The reluctance of the political parties and leaders to accept the political nature of the problem was the biggest issue. The leaders very well understood the importance and significance of political factor in the insurgency. It also was a well understood fact by the state and the political leaders although they pretended otherwise. The formations of the “Deuba Commission” and the “Dhami Commission”¹⁹⁹ are the significant evidences. The reports submitted by those committees were very positive in

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Prem Singh Dhami was a politician and minister, belonging to the CPN-UML. He was elected to the parliament in 1994. In April 1997 he was appointed by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba to head a 'Working Committee for the Study of Maoist Activities and Finding Solutions', in order to counter the influence of the CPN-M. The Committee was also known as the 'Dhami Commission'.

the way of solving the issue. By the end, the political interests of various parties were the main obstacle in forming and implementing a well accepted policy.

Establishing the legitimacy of the state authority could have been an effective tool for gaining support of the population. The GoN failed to take enough steps in this.

Conducting a local election was an important step to establish legitimacy in the Maoist affected area. When the activities of the Maoists started to increase, the GoN decided to deploy police to establish its control. The police were also directed to establish legitimacy of the state; however, the police actions had more negative impact later on. “They (the police operation) managed to physically eliminate a good number of Maoist cadres but contributed to the strength and spread of the Maoist movement.”²⁰⁰

As the state failed to formulate any specific policy guidelines and mobilized the police to “maintain law and order,” it created confusion in the police. In the lack of specific guidelines, police tried to use force to suppress the Maoist activities which led to widespread human right violations. As the situation worsened, the police actions were more indiscriminate and violated the rule of law. This issue was greatly highlighted by the media and the human right organizations, worsening the image of the GoN.

Media played an important role to enhance the expectations of the population. The state had no plan to manage the expectations of the population. The state did have sufficient media but failed to employ them to manage the expectations of the population. ISDP was a good concept to win the support of population by economic and security programs, but “it (ISDP) was Band-Aids when open heart surgery was necessary.”²⁰¹

²⁰⁰Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The challenges and Responses*, 41.

²⁰¹Marks, Interview.

Understanding of the operational environment was a much weaker aspect of the COIN effort of Nepal. The GoN and the political leaders completely failed in this aspect. It was mainly due to the power struggle between the political parties. Initially the King intended to use the Maoists against the political parties. Likewise the main political parties NC and UML tried to use the conflict to fulfill their own political interests. Hence, most of the stake holders of the state took the issue not as a problem but an opportunity to further their political interests.

Unity of effort is another sector where the COIN effort was ineffective. The state failed to maintain the unity of effort, make long term plans and keep commitments. It was mainly due to lack of unified policy guidelines of the GoN. The differences between the political parties and the King had another significant impact on it. The political instability and lack of adequate resources prevented the state and political parties in making a long term commitment. Even if a government led by one party or one leader made such a commitment, the next government led by another party or leader would not continue it due to different political interests and the lack of resources.

Lack of joint civil-military planning resulted in a weak intelligence operation. There was lack of confidence between the political parties and the intelligence community. Hence, the intelligence organizations were weak and dysfunctional by the time the insurgency started. They could not provide intelligence input to the GoN. It was not possible to develop an intelligence network in a short period of time. The result was that the state was forced to react to the actions of the Maoists all the time.

Isolating the insurgents was perhaps the central idea of all the GoN and political leaders, but nobody had a workable idea on how to accomplish it. Hence the GoN put

more emphasis on the physical control of the insurgents. Given the economic condition and capability of the state, it would have been difficult to do it without substantial help and support from the international community. ISDP was one of the most significant economic plans embedded with security which was pretty effective in some parts, especially in the Gorkha district. The initial results gave clear indications that it would have a positive impact but it would be very expensive in terms of resources.

Perhaps suitability of force is more important than the level of force for success of COIN operation. In the case of Nepal, the Nepal police was superior in terms of manpower, training, weapon and equipment than the Maoists in the initial phase. The police easily dominated the Maoists in terms of physical strength. However, the approach of the police in dealing with the Maoists proved to be wrong as the actions backfired. The police were not trained in dealing with the insurgency, so they were not the best suited force. Use of police was correct in terms of level of force but it was not correct in terms of suitability of force to deal with special circumstances.

It was difficult for the GoN to fight a long COIN without international support. In the same way, the Maoist insurgency could not have developed or survived without support of various international agencies. Both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents received significant international support. The GoN received support mainly from the governments of USA, United Kingdom and India. That support was not consistent as the government in Nepal changed quite quickly and there was a big shift in policy after every change in government. Hence, Nepal could not exploit the international support to fight against the insurgency.

From the illustrations above, it is apparent that the GoN did try to fight against the insurgency with all the means available. It did try to use the COIN principles in one way or another. The state slowly understood the environment, did try to implement economic programs to address the grievances of the population and tried to address the political agendas of the Maoists. These efforts were not well coordinated and directed. Also the state lacked a continuing policy, a stable government and sufficient economic resources.

These examples of Nepal demonstrate that an effective implementation of COIN principles require certain preconditions. Although JP 3-24 does not clearly state any such preconditions for employing its principles, these seem necessary. In Nepal, many of the COIN principles were used but they failed to produce the desired result. This at least indicates that simply using COIN principles does not guarantee the success of COIN efforts. The counterinsurgent should endeavor to prepare a suitable foundation for the effective implementation of the principles. Once the conditions are suitable, only then can the employment of principles be effective to produce desired results.

For the effectiveness of the COIN principles and overall COIN effort, the first and foremost important factor is the unshakable political commitment of the state, or the counterinsurgent, to defeat the insurgents. Only a strong and honest government led by highly motivated and unselfish leaders may have such a commitment. Unless the state is honestly committed in defeating the insurgent, it will never be possible to defeat the insurgency. The statesmanship displayed by Nelson Mandela in South Africa is one example where an honest and committed leader prevented further conflict. The success of

COIN operation in Sri Lanka may be a relevant example of the successful commitment of the state to defeat the Tamil insurgency in 2009 after almost half century of conflict.²⁰²

In the case of Nepal, the state authority was very weak. Although the state officially was fighting against the insurgency, the reality was different. None of the stake holders were actually committed to defeat the insurgency because of their competing political interests. The King perhaps saw it as an opportunity to weaken the political parties and he was confident to retain the state power with the support of the Army which was under him due to its traditional relationship. The political parties used this issue to blame each other, weaken rival political parties, and reach for power.

In Nepal, the state never became a strong unified institution. So, it could not commit itself against the insurgency. The Maoists clearly understood the intentions of all those stake holders. They always targeted the state authority and used a policy of “divide and conquer” to weaken the state in their favor. Finally, when all those stake holders realized they had made a mistake, it was too late.

The second important factor for the successful implementation of the COIN principles is the sufficiency of resources. Since it is an accepted fact that COIN is a long term war for the support of masses, it is difficult to win without adequate resources. It is not possible to win the support of the population without addressing their immediate and long term grievances. This may be too expensive a campaign for a poor and less developed country.

²⁰²The longstanding LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka ended in the year 2009 after the Sri Lanka army destroyed LTTE Armed wing and killed its leader Prabhakaran.

Nepal surely lacked the economic might to prevent such a situation. It lagged far behind in terms of economic development during the “Rana Regime” and then the “Panchayat rule.” After the political change in 1990, the expectations of the people were high. The state, however, had very few resources and too little capability to fulfill such expectations. Nepal did have some natural resources which could be used to fulfill some of the expectations of the people, but the state lacked the vision and expertise to utilize them. Even when the state tried to formulate plan for utilizing those resources, it failed because of the conflicting interests of various national and international interest groups.

The Maoists exploited the weakness of the state to fulfill the expectations of population. The newly established democratic system had neither any plan nor resources to fulfill it. “The government simply had no plan to address the people expectations. The presence of government was nil in the Maoist dominated /affected areas.”²⁰³

When the state decided to employ the police against the Maoists, it should have been supported by economic programs. The state lacked the necessary resources. ISDP was one of the significant economic programs, but it could not bring the desired result due to lack of enough economic resources. Another significant issue was that “Nepal government had neither adequate funds nor resources for development programs, nor adequate and effective forces to defend those ISDP areas in Rapti Zone.”²⁰⁴

The third important factor is international support. The support from most of the countries was with various terms and conditions which reduced the continuity and effectiveness of the support. The issue of human rights and the rule of law became the

²⁰³Sharma, Interview.

²⁰⁴Angbuhang, Interview.

biggest problem. The COIN effort of the security forces could not become error free and the case of human right violations were highlighted by various nongovernment organizations. Such cases reduced the support of the Western governments.

The US and United Kingdom were the key partners of the GoN and it did receive some support in its efforts. But their support was not sufficient enough to change the course of the conflict. Other various political and human rights issues always impacted the policy of the US and United Kingdom toward Nepal. The GoN did little to win full support of the US and the United Kingdom government which would have been more meaningful in shaping the national and the regional environment.

The most significant international support for Nepal could have been that of India. Although India provided GoN both lethal and non-lethal support, many blamed India for its soft approach to the Maoists. The Maoist leaders operated from various places of India, but the Indian government never tried to prevent it. Some people even accuse India of clandestine support of the Maoists, meaning that India supported both the GoN and the Maoists to fulfill its own political interest.

In conclusion, overall COIN effort of GoN was less effective until 2001. The unstable political situation leading lack of strong commitment of the state, and unreliable support of international community in terms of money and resources to the state impacted the overall COIN effort of the GoN. In overall, the political factors, lack of resources and international support were the key COIN principles lacking in the overall COIN effort of the GoN which resulted in the failure of the COIN effort.

Recommendations for Further Research

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal took some interesting twists and turns after 2001 assassination of the King. The political maneuvering of the Maoists became clearer and more decisive. The new King came to the focal point of the conflict once he took over the state authority with the support of the Nepal Army. The democratic practice in Nepal was subdued by the steps of the King. Although the Army was mobilized against the Maoists, it had little impact on the progress of the Maoists. The political games and maneuvers were more decisive. In this regard, an in-depth research and analysis on the Maoist political and military strategy may be a sector for further research. Similarly, the open border for supporting organizations in India played a significant role in the development of the Maoist insurgency which may be another significant area for research and analysis.

The political maneuvers of the Maoists were interesting. Most of the time, they looked like they were more focused on military operations, but their political steps became more lethal to the state authority and the King. It was successful in isolating the King and the army after 2001. The military operations of the NA were successful at the tactical level but there was no supporting political and economic plan. All the political parties came to agree with the Maoists and finally the King had to surrender.

Given the geographical situation and availability of local resources, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal could not have survived without international support, especially from India. The Maoists exploited the open and porous border to conduct their activities, for safe sanctuary and so on. Most of the people in Nepal blame India for not honestly cooperating with Nepal in controlling the cross-border activities of the Maoist which would have been more effective.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What was your position during the dates of events in question and what was your job description?
2. In your experience, what specific principles were employed in the fight against Maoist insurgency? Were they effectively implemented?
3. As far as you could observe, what were the motivations and grievances of the individuals sympathetic to or supporting the insurgents?
4. How was the principle of “unity of effort employed?
5. In your experience, was the Integrated Security and Development Program an effective approach against the Maoist insurgency?
6. How did the government try to address the growing expectations of people in the Maoist- affected areas? Based on your experience, did the government strengthen its legitimacy?
7. In your experience, did the government have enough security forces to provide effective security to the population?
8. Based on your experience and observations, did the government learn and adapt?
9. In your experience, how well were counterinsurgency plans implemented at the lowest level?
10. In your experience, what was the role of the US government in advising, supporting and assisting counterinsurgency operations?

APPENDIX B

40-POINT DEMAND

Demands Related to Nationalism

1. Regarding the 1950 Treaty between India and Nepal, all unequal stipulations and agreements should be removed.
2. HMG [His Majesty's Government] should admit that the anti-nationalist Tanakpur agreement was wrong, and the Mahakali Treaty, incorporating same, should be nullified.
3. The entire Nepal-Indian border should be controlled and systematized. Cars with Indian number plates, which are plying the roads of Nepal, should not be allowed.
4. Gorkha recruiting centers should be closed and decent jobs should be arranged for the recruits.
5. In several areas of Nepal, where foreign technicians are given precedence over Nepali technicians for certain local jobs, a system of work permits should be instituted for the foreigners.
6. The monopoly of foreign capital in Nepal's industry, trade and economic sector should be stopped.
7. Sufficient income should be generated from customs duties for the country's economic development.
8. The cultural pollution of imperialists and expansionists should be stopped. Hindi video, cinema, and all kinds of such newspapers and magazines should be completely stopped. Inside Nepal, import and distribution of vulgar Hindi films, video cassettes and magazines should be stopped.
9. Regarding NGOs and INGOs: Bribing by imperialists and expansionists in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

Demands Related to the Public and Its Well-Being

10. A new Constitution has to be drafted by the people's elected representatives.
11. All the special rights and privileges of the King and his family should be ended.
12. Army, police and administration should be under the people's control.
13. The Security Act and all other repressive acts should be abolished.
14. All the false charges against the people of Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchok, Sindhuli, Dhanusha and Ramechhap should be withdrawn and all the people falsely charged should be released.
15. Armed police operations in the different districts should immediately be stopped.

16. Regarding Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuvan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and other people who disappeared from police custody at different times, the government should constitute a special investigating committee to look into these crimes and the culprits should be punished and appropriate compensation given to their families.
17. People who died during the time of the movement should be declared as martyrs and their families and those who have been wounded and disabled should be given proper compensation. Strong action should be taken against the killers.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular state.
19. Girls should be given equal property rights to those of their brothers.
20. All kinds of exploitation and prejudice based on caste should be ended. In areas having a majority of one ethnic group, that group should have autonomy over that area.
21. The status of “dalits” as untouchables should be ended and the system of untouchability should be ended once and for all.
22. All languages should be given equal status. Up until middle-high school level (ucchamadyamic) arrangements should be made for education to be given in the children's mother tongue.
23. There should be guarantee of free speech and free press. The communications media should be completely autonomous.
24. Intellectuals, historians, artists and academicians engaged in other cultural activities should be guaranteed intellectual freedom.
25. In both the Terai and hilly regions there is prejudice and misunderstanding in backward areas. This should be ended and the backward areas should be assisted. Good relations should be established between the villages and the city.
26. Decentralization in real terms should be applied to local areas, which should have local rights, autonomy and control over their own resources.

Demand Related to the People's Lives

27. Those who cultivate the land should own it. (The tiller should have right to the soil he/she tills.) The land of rich landlords should be confiscated and distributed to the homeless and others who have no land.
28. Brokers and commission agents should have their property confiscated and that money should be invested in industry.
29. All should be guaranteed work and should be given a stipend until jobs are found for them.
30. HMG [His Majesty's Government] should pass strong laws ensuring that people involved in industry and agriculture should receive minimum wages.

31. The homeless should be given suitable accommodation. Until HMG [His Majesty's Government] can provide such accommodation they should not be removed from where they are squatting.
32. Poor farmers should be completely freed from debt. Loans from the Agricultural Development Bank by poor farmers should be completely written off. Small industries should be given loans.
33. Fertilizer and seeds should be easily and cheaply available, and the farmers should be given a proper market price for their production.
34. Flood and drought victims should be given all necessary help
35. All should be given free and scientific medical service and education and education for profit should be completely stopped.
36. Inflation should be controlled and laborers salaries should be raised in direct ratio with the rise in prices. Daily essential goods should be made cheap and easily available.
37. Arrangements should be made for drinking water, good roads, and electricity in the villages.
38. Cottage and other small industries should be granted special facilities and protection.
39. Corruption, black marketing, smuggling, bribing, the taking of commissions, etc. should all be stopped.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be given help and protection.

Source: International Crisis Group, “*Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy* Crisis Group Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/ south-asia/nepal/104_nepal_s_maoists_their_aims_structure_and_strategy.ashx (assessed 9 December 2009).

APPENDIX C

HISTORY OF NEPAL: A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

400 BC.-Birth of Gautama Buddha at Lumbini.

465AD.-Changu Narayan temple was built by King Manadev of Kathmandu. The epigraphic evidence existed in the temple is the oldest evidence of the existence of the state.

879 AD-Beginning of Nepal Era.

1200 AD-Commencement of Malla ruler's period in Kathmandu.

1559AD- Drabya Shah seizes Gorkha.

1743- Prithvi Narayan Shah became the king of Gorkha.

1768 - Gorkha ruler Prithvi Narayan Shah conquers Kathmandu and lays foundations for unified kingdom.

1786-First Nepal-Tibet War.

1791-Second Nepal-Tibet War.

1792 – Chinese invasion in Nepal.

1814-16 - Anglo-Nepalese War; culminates in “treaty of Sugauli” which establishes Nepal's current boundaries.

1846 - Nepal falls under sway of hereditary chief ministers known as Ranas, who dominate the monarchy and cut off country from outside world.

1923 - Treaty with Britain affirms Nepal's sovereignty.

1950 - Anti-Rana forces based in India form alliance with monarch.

1951 - End of Rana rule. Sovereignty of crown restored and anti-Rana rebels in Nepalese Congress Party form government.

1955 - Nepal joins the United Nations.

1955 - King Tribhuwan dies, King Mahendra ascends throne.

1959 - Multi-party constitution adopted.

1960 - King Mahendra seizes control and suspends parliament, constitution and party politics.

1962 - New constitution provides for non-party system of councils known as “Panchayat” under which king exercises sole power.

1972 - King Mahendra dies, succeeded by Birendra.

1980 - Constitutional referendum follows agitation for reform. Small majority favors keeping existing Panchayat system.

1990 - Pro-democracy agitation coordinated by NC and leftist groups. Street protests suppressed by security forces resulting in deaths and mass arrests. King Birendra eventually bows to pressure and agrees to new democratic constitution.

1991 - Nepali Congress Party wins first democratic elections. Girija Prasad Koirala becomes prime minister.

1994 - Koirala's government defeated in no-confidence motion. New elections lead to formation of Communist government.

1995 - Communist government dissolved.

1995 - Radical leftist group, the CPN-M begins insurrection in rural areas aimed at abolishing monarch and establishing People's Republic, sparking a conflict that would drag on for over a decade.

1997 - Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba loses no-confidence vote, ushering in period of increased political instability, with frequent changes of prime minister.

2000 - GP Koirala returns as prime minister, heading the ninth government in 10 years.

2001, 1 June - King Birendra, Queen and other close relatives killed in shooting spree by drunken Crown Prince Deependra, who then shoots himself.

2001, 4 June - Prince Gyanendra crowned King of Nepal after Deependra dies of his injuries.

2001 July - Maoist rebels step up campaign of violence. Prime Minister GP Koirala quits over the violence; succeeded by Sher Bahadur Deuba.

2001 November - Maoists end four-month old truce with government, declare peace talks with government failed. Launch coordinated attacks on army and police posts.

2001 November - State of emergency declared after more than 100 people are killed in four days of violence. King Gyanendra orders army to crush the Maoist rebels. Many hundreds are killed in rebel and government operations in the following months.

2002 May - Parliament dissolved, fresh elections called amid political confrontation over extending the state of emergency. Sher Bahadur Deuba heads interim government, renews emergency.

2002 October - King Gyanendra dismisses Deuba and indefinitely puts off elections set for November. Lokendra Bahadur Chand appointed as PM.

2003 January - Rebels, government declare ceasefire.

2003 May-June - Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigns as PM; king appoints his own nominee Surya Bahadur Thapa as new premier.

2003 August - Rebels pull out of peace talks with government and end seven-month truce. The following months see resurgence of violence and frequent clashes between students/activists and police.

2004 May - Royalist Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa resigns following weeks of street protests by opposition groups.

2004 June - King Gyanendra reappoints Sher Bahadur Deuba as prime minister with the task of holding elections.

2005, 1 February - King Gyanendra dismisses Prime Minister Deuba and his government, declares a state of emergency and assumes direct power, citing the need to defeat Maoist rebels.

2005, 30 April - King lifts the state of emergency amid international pressure.

2005 November - Maoist rebels and main opposition parties agree on a program intended to restore democracy.

2006 April - King Gyanendra agrees to reinstate parliament following weeks of violent strikes and protests against direct royal rule. GP Koirala is appointed as prime minister. Maoist rebels call a three-month ceasefire.

2006 May - Parliament votes unanimously to curtail the king's political powers. The government and Maoist rebels begin peace talks, the first in nearly three years.

2006 16 June - Rebel leader Prachanda and PM Koirala hold talks - the first such meeting between the two sides - and agree that the Maoists should be brought into an interim government.

2006 November - The government and Maoists sign a peace accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), declaring a formal end to a 10-year rebel insurgency. The rebels are to join a transitional government and their weapons will be placed under UN supervision.

2007 April - Former Maoist rebels join interim government, a move that takes them into the political mainstream.

2008 April - Former Maoist rebels win the largest bloc of seats in elections to the new constituent assembly, but fail to achieve an outright majority.

2008 May - Nepal becomes a republic.

2008 August - Maoist leader Prachanda forms coalition government, with Nepali Congress going into opposition.

Source:-BBC; John Whelpton, "History of Nepal."

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